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The Week

TEN million Russians will die before spring unless help is sent to them. What is America doing about it? The Friends are feeding a few hundred thousand. The Relief Administration was feeding 207,000 children in Russia on November 1st, 500,000 on November 20th, 750,000 on December 1st, and expects to be feeding a million on New Year's Day. With its present resources, it cannot plan to feed more than 1,200,000 children for the first eight months of 1922, at a cost of about $12,000,000. Such a schedule fails to provide for at least a million children, and of course leaves out older people altogether. What's to be done? From Moscow Mr. Lyman Brown suggests a government loan to Russia of $50,000,000. With all our hearts we ought to welcome this plan, and give Congress to understand that anything short of it convicts America of the grossest cruelty.

IT is reported in the Times of December 2nd that the electric light and power company of O'Neill, Nebraska, has begun to burn corn. The plant is one of some importance and should help materially to relieve the local market of its surplus corn. That is good business for the farmers and for the power company. Good business; but on the other side of the world there are ten million people apparently doomed to die of starvation in the next one hundred and fifty days. That is sixty-six thousand a day, if our minds shrink before aggregates. A ton of corn would suffice to save ten lives. The mature citizen of O'Neill may be reminded, as he turns on his light, of a historical romance popular in his youth which described an antique feast illuminated by the torch light from blazing mummies. His light is even more exquisite: the life-light of ten Russians dying for want of each ton of corn. If the comparison occurs to him he may shudder a moment, but then the thought will sink from his mind as he unfolds his newspaper or opens his book under the pleasant white light, odorless, unstained. What can he do about it? Not his will, but the collective will of America, could save those ten million lives. Not he, but collective America, will presently reply to the voice that comes menacingly out of the void: "Am I my Russian brother's keeper?"

IT is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Interborough directors have in the past been scandalously lavish in their dividend policies, and that no small part of the present embarrassment of the company is due to the fact that funds which should have gone into reserves were dissipated. In the same way much of the present distress of the railway companies is attributable to reckless and wasteful financiering in years gone by. But recognition of this fact will not help us directly to improvements in subway and railway traffic. It will help us indirectly if it forces us to reflect seriously upon the natural results of private financing of enterprises whose returns are subject to strict public regulation. Private finance lives by its flexibility. Policies that appear wasteful, such

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as the payment of dangerously large dividends, may be pursued by even conservative and disinterested directors, who see in them an essential means of strengthening corporation credit in preparation for further operations. Public regulation frowns upon such policies, and subordinates considerations of immediate credit in the financial markets to the principle of adequate service at fair charges. There is an inevitable contradiction here, and the result of it is that the public is neither supplied with adequate facilities nor protected against exploitation. Sooner or later it will be driven to the conclusion that either regulation of returns or private financing will have to be eliminated. As the former alternative is politically impracticable, it can only be a question of time when the financing of public services will pass over to the field of government.

PROBABLY the ugliest question which still remains to be decided with respect to naval armament concerns the future of the submarine. The program with respect to submarines which Secretary Hughes advanced on November 12th assumed that submarines with the possible exception of the "cruiser" type were essentially a defensive weapon and that a comparatively large number of them in the hands of any one power could not be used for aggressive purposes. The British have submitted weighty objections to this contention. There is no trustworthy distinction between cruiser and other submarines. Both could be adapted to long voyages and to commerce destroying activities. If they are in existence when the next war breaks out, the government which possesses them will follow the German precedent, particularly if it is fighting a power stronger than itself in capital ships. This contention is probably true. There is much, consequently, to be said in favor of the total abolition of the submarine. If that is impossible, arrangements should be made to limit their numbers as carefully as the number of the battleships are limited. We hope that the American government will modify its original program in this respect.

BRITISH opinion appears to be moving rapidly toward a recognition of the necessity of revising the indemnity terms. On one thing, according to Mr. Grasty, there is a definite opinion among the experts, and that is that the 82,000,000,000 gold marks in class C bonds should be cancelled. Of course they should be cancelled. The Class A and Class B bonds in themselves exceed Germany's reasonable capacity to pay. They exceed any fair calculation of what Germany bound herself to pay under the pre-armistice agreement. The Class C bonds have no financial standing. They serve no other end than to keep alive the memory of the dishonor of the victors in welching on a pledge they made in order to escape the losses that would have had to be incurred if the war had been fought to the point of unconditional surrender. Those bonds are a great black spot on the record of Allied integrity, and the sooner the spot is expunged, the better. But there is an essential preliminary to such action. That is the repudiation of the item "pensions and separation allowances," whose inclusion in the bill against Germany produced the over inflation of which the dishonorable eighty-two billions are the numerical expression. Confining indemnification to damages inflicted upon the civil population of the Allied countries and their property, as definitely provided in the pre-armistice agreement, would throw to France a larger share of the indemnity that can be paid. Will British opinion accept such a readjustment? That is the final test of its sincerity.

MR. CHARLES GRASTY, in a despatch to the Times of December 2nd, declares that "it may be stated as a fact that at the time of the London protocol the best opinion among reparations experts was that 130,000,000,000 gold marks and 26 percent on exports were beyond German capacity, but it was wise for Germany to accept under the conditions proposed." Another instance of "now it can be told" journalism. We have the highest respect for Mr. Grasty's ability to get at the real opinions of men, however well blanketed with talk for publication. He must have been aware at the time that the terms Germany was advised to accept "under the conditions proposed," i. e., the seizure of the Ruhr, were regarded as impossible by every one who knew anything about the matter. But we search his despatches of that time in vain for any indication that he knew it. In fairness to his readers Mr. Grasty ought to invent a cryptogram which would tell them when he is speaking his mind and when he is tempering the wind of his words to their shorn condition.

ON another page of this issue Professor David Friday arrives, by a series of startling calculations, at the conclusion that the capital accumulation of the people of the United States for this year will amount to more than eight billion dollars. From this fact, which for most people will be an amazing revelation, and a complete reversal of what they had believed, the deduction is inevitable that, severe as our industrial depression has been, far from wasting capital it has permitted accumulation and investment on an enormous scale. It now appears

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that taxes, which were usually blamed for the greater share of the depression, have been powerless to dam this huge flow of investment. What can now be the answer of those who have been incessantly complaining that until the tax burden were made lighter no surplus could be accumulated on which to start business going again? Yet such a view has been common. For instance, in the World we find Mr. Frederick Todd, Secretary of the First Federal Foreign Banking Association, asserting that "The amount that the Government will take in the form of direct taxation this year is twice the amount which has been carefully estimated as the total of personal savings of the people of the whole country." Which amount he places at $1,600,000,000. We refer Mr. Todd, with the myth that taxation has crushed capital and discouraged savings, to Professor Friday and his $8,000,000,000 total.

THE arrest of Mrs. Juliet Barrett Rublee for her part in the Birth Control meeting of several weeks ago adds another chapter to the story of the New York City administration's useless high-handedness. Even though the official who originally ordered Mrs. Rublee's arrest later disowned his action, even though the complaint against her was immediately dismissed in court, the fact remains that a stupid outrage was committed. What redress has the victim of such false arrest? Very little. A suit for damages would not come up for trial for a year or more, and at best would result in the award of a few dollars. No sense of decency seems to restrain the police from arbitrary arrests, and the law as it exists is too feeble to act as a deterrent. Obviously one remedy is legislation providing swifter justice and a greater penalty for false arrest. Here is a matter which is well worth investigation by the New York Bar Association.

FAMINE is the immediate source of Russia's present sufferings, and it is natural and proper that the first effort of American philanthropy should be devoted to feeding the starving. But we should not forget that a pestilence of infectious diseases always follows in the wake of famine, to complete its baleful work, and extend it far beyond its original field. The Hoover organization is not equipped to cope with disease, nor are other agencies such as that of the Friends able to handle more than a fraction of the work of medical relief. An organization recently formed in New York under the name "Medical Unit for Service in Russia" (Room 303, 110 West 40th Street) offers to Americans who are alive to the horrors of epidemic disease an opportunity to give immediate help. The Unit is endorsed by the Russian Red Cross and by the Friends of Soviet Russia, and has already received assurances from the Soviet government that its services will be welcomed. It will take to Russia a completely equipped field hospital, ambulance, sterilizers for controlling the spread of typhus, all necessary medicines, together with food supplies sufficient for its own personnel and for the patients who come under its care. The Friends of Soviet Russia have pledged food to the amount of $50,000, and large donations of drugs and apparatus have also been pledged. The Unit needs money, however, and friends of humanity will search far for a better investment in the general good.

THE three percent immigration law is working out as was to have been expected. The quotas of Greece, Spain, Jugoslavia, Palestine, Turkey, Syria and Smyrna are already exhausted. This means that no more immigrants from these countries will be admitted until July 1, 1922. It also means that, as in the past since the passage of the law, hundreds of people will arrive here only to find that they cannot enter, and must either be deported or admitted under some arrangement which virtually evades the law. The facilities for receiving immigrants at our ports of entry will have to undergo periods of congestion alternating with slack periods when a number of quotas are simultaneously exhausted. We must expect a tremendous rush the first of next July, with the familiar spectacle of immigrant laden ships racing bow to bow for Ellis Island.

THE Loyal Coalition and the American Legion have clashed. The Loyal Coalition had hung over its headquarters near the State House in Boston the American flag of 1777, which is made up of the thirteen stripes, but has in place of the field of stars the cross of the Union Jack. The American Legion refused to accept this symbol of the 1777 brand of loyalty. "The flag was not taken down," declares the Coalition proudly, "although to save argument it was placed upon another pole." The whole occurrence, from one point of view, reflects credit on all participants. First, the Legion, with commendable self restraint, called on the police to make or execute whatever law was necessary to the situation. Then, although one of the Legion so far forgot himself as to suggest that the flag "be thrown into the cellar," the Coalition instead of mixing with him then and there took advertising space in the Sunday papers to characterize his remark as "a gross insult to the flag

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of Washington and the first flag of the United States" (sic), and to "venture the suggestion that the American Legion in this locality under the present leadership, has something to learn not only about flags but about what they stand for." We agree in this opinion, and hope the Loyal Coalition will continue its instruction of the American Legion with those amenities on both sides which remind one how far ahead of Centralia is Boston.

FOR the first time in the history of the law, a labor union has successfully invoked the conspiracy law against employers. The International Ladies Garment Workers have secured an injunction restraining the manufacturers' association from any action that might violate the agreement effective between the two parties until June 1, 1922. This law has frequently been resorted to by employers against their labor, and its one-sided use in the past has given the unions some ground for their denunciations of "one-way" law. It is quite likely, however, that in legally skillful hands the law can be made to function against both sides. When its other edge has been sharpened, so that it cuts both ways, this particular law will be finally recognized as the impracticable and ineffective instrument it has in fact always been.

AS a feat of human engineering the negotiations between Mr. Lloyd George, the representatives of Dail Eireann, and Sir James Craig deserve to stand among the masterpieces. The latest news gives fresh hopes that the bridge projected last July, which for five months has hung wavering in the air, may at last find anchorage on the farther bank. Two chasms have to be crossed without a placement between them—sovereignty and unity. The spanning of both has to be done simultaneously. The Irish representatives, in view of past deceptions, cannot surrender sovereignty without being assured of unity, and this assurance Great Britain cannot give except by withdrawing the separate parliament already granted to N. E. Ulster. It is now officially announced that the representatives of the British Parliament and of Dail Eireann have reached an agreement, the terms of which have been communicated to Sir James Craig. One forecast of the terms is that the Irish will owe allegiance to a free state which is to hold membership in the empire, and that N. E. Ulster is to join this Irish state with power to contract out after a certain time. Protestant Ulster is perhaps still in a position to refuse; then the responsibility will be clear. But even if Sir James Craig's veto still runs, the agreement of the Dail with the British Cabinet affords good hope that the structure of Irish settlement can be preserved, even in its suspension; and in that case the yielding of N. E. Ulster is again a question of time.

A DISPATCH to the World from Lahore, India, brings news of the arrest of Lajpat Rai, president of the Indian National Congress. This action following the arrest, trial, and imprisonment in October of the Ali brothers and Dr. Kitchlew, the leaders of the Khilafat movement, indicates that the British rulers of India are now meeting with force the Non-Cooperative Movement of peaceful revolution. This was to be expected. The representatives of any imperial power are sure in the long run to become exasperated or frightened by continued passive resistance, and prefer to meet their opponents in the open. The visit of the Prince of Wales at this time naturally increases the sense of irritation and of responsibility on the part of the British government. The arrest of the leaders of the non-cooperators, however, is a peculiar provocation to the mass of followers, and further deprives this mass of an influence which so far has stood for non-violence. The situation of India drifts day by day toward a catastrophe the magnitude of which is beyond conjecture.

The Culmination of the Conference

THE culminating moment of the Conference has not yet arrived, but it is steadily approaching. The alert spectator can already peer through the glare and the gloom and discern what in general the final issue will look like when it arrives. The policies of the most important of the conferees are taking definite shape and assuming possible and even plausible relationships one to another. Two radically different outcomes are becoming distinguishable. Let us consider how far we can disentangle what they are and what each is worth.

The Japanese government during the past week has disclosed the general character of its policy and tactics. It is acting on the defensive. It realizes the necessity of making concessions both in respect to armaments and in respect to its position in China, but it will not concede any more than it can help. It is not sure as yet how much it will have to concede, and until its delegates in Washington make up their minds how formidable the offensive is and on what part of their defenses the attack will exert most persistent pressure, they are holding up all concessions. They will not definitely accept the 5-5-3 naval ratio nor any of

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the administrative reforms for which the Chinese are asking, until they know how much they can escape from conceding in Shantung, Manchuria or Siberia. They propose to make it all part of one comprehensive bargain. They propose above all to obtain a quid pro quo for everything they yield. If they agree to turn Shantung over to the Chinese, to modify the Twenty-one Demands or to accept the 5-5-3 naval ratio, it will be for the purpose of obtaining a title to their privileges and possessions in Manchuria which will be explicitly guaranteed by the other powers. They are working for a comprehensive "settlement" in which they will yield say twenty-five percent of their possessions and privileges in China in order to secure for the other seventy-five percent the endorsement of the British Empire and the United States.

The position of the British government is more a matter of guess work, but its behavior and its propaganda up to date enable us to venture a fairly shrewd guess as to what British policy is and where it will come out. It is divided between a lively and an anxious desire to cooperate with the United States even at the expense of its friendship with Japan and a great fear of what might happen to its possessions, dominions and prestige in the Far East if Japanese friendship were converted into hostility. It would willingly exchange the Japanese alliance for an alliance with the United States which would arrange for a common policy in China and a joint guarantee of each other's territory in the Pacific, but this alliance its delegates know they cannot get. Failing it they are seeking some middle road, which will so far as possible satisfy American scruples about China without seriously alienating Japan. This middle road necessarily begins somewhere near the route which the Japanese are laying out and ends, also, not far from the Japanese goal. The British, like the Allies, clearly want a "settlement" based not upon the rendering of honest and thoroughgoing assistance to China in regaining and in freely exercising her independence, but upon a bargain and a balance of contending interests. The object of the bargain will be to guarantee a dubious peace and stability in the Far East rather than to promote the reign of recognized principles of international right and the ultimately complete alleviation of Chinese grievances. The only ambiguous aspect of their policy consists in the doubt as to how far they will help the American government to press upon Japan the desirability of a bargain more rather than less favorable to China.

The Chinese delegation in Washington are suffering from profound disquiet at the tendency of the negotiations. If the outcome of the Conference is to consist in a bargain among their "protectors" which would be consummated at their expense and which would sanctify a substantial portion of the status quo by international guarantees, they would consider themselves betrayed and deserted by this country. Their personal position is extremely difficult. Should they consent to anything of that kind, they will be roughly treated by their countrymen whenever they return to China. They are already being severely criticized for consenting to negotiate with Japan about Shantung. The most aggressive body of public opinion in China consists in the radical national party which is not inclined to compromise and which in the event of the consummation of the proposed bargain would probably grow in popularity, in aggressiveness and in irreconcilability. It is already agitating for a withdrawal from the Conference by the Chinese delegation, and if the outcome of the Conference is a victory for the Japanese-British policy, it will insist probably with success upon a declaration, by the representatives of what is called the Chinese government, of future non-cooperation. How effective such a protest would be, we do not pretend to know. It would probably cause convulsions in China and prolonged chaos, but in the long run it would probably also strengthen the radical nationalists. Their only weapon against Japan and the western powers would consist of the boycott and non-cooperation, but it is a weapon which the Chinese are capable of using effectively, and it might become a powerful and a dangerous instrument of resistance. The Englishmen who are working for the consummation of a bargain which would recognize a substantial part of the existing possessions and privileges of foreigners in China should consider this possibility. What would be the effect in India of the adoption by the Chinese nationalists as a protest against the carrying out of the bargain proposed by Japan of an agitation similar to that of Gandhi in favor of a general boycott and non-cooperation?

Assuming that the foregoing sketch roughly delineates the tendency and the objects of Japanese, British and Chinese conduct at the Conference what under such conditions should be the policy of the American government? It looks like a difficult course to steer, and it is difficult; but at present at least there is, we believe, a way out. It does not consist in following Mr. Wilson's example in Paris and in accepting an unprincipled bargain in the supposed interest of an immediate "settlement." Neither does it consist in dissolving the

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Conference and in refusing future cooperation because the Japanese will not consent to a complete restitution and the British will not support the demand for restitution. The way out consists rather in urging and pressing Japan and Great Britain to restore as much as possible of the territory, contracts and privileges which they have appropriated in China, without purchasing these concessions by any bargain or any guarantees of title to the rest of the alienated property. It would be far preferable to accept, as a free concession, say, ten percent of what Great Britain and Japan ought to yield, than to purchase, say, thirty percent by a guarantee of the remaining seventy percent. The United States has never yet recognized any of the specific Japanese encroachments on Chinese territory and independence except in so far as they are embodied in the Treaty of Portsmouth. It never should recognize them. It should at the end of the present Conference postpone the consideration of their final status and in the meantime keep the grievances alive by arranging for commissions of investigation. The American government can afford to wait; but it cannot afford to compromise for the sake of an unprincipled and an unstable peace.

The purpose which would underlie such a policy would be that of keeping conference alive as an agency of international adjustment in the Far East. If it either compromised on a bargain or impatiently dissolved itself because of the meagreness of its present fruits, the present Conference would leave the world the loser as the result of its deliberations. But by accepting as much as it can get with clean hands and by referring the other questions without prejudice to decision by future conferences, it would in our opinion vindicate the existing assembly and leave the world substantially the gainer as a consequence of its work. The mere calling of this Conference and the ventilation of British and Japanese policy in the Far East have aroused public opinion to a much clearer understanding of the iniquity of the past behavior of the European powers and Japan in China and they have compelled Japan at least temporarily to abandon her aggression. The Japanese are slipping. Their past brand of statecraft cannot justify itself in a world which is longing for disarmament and appeasement. At the end of another year the agitation and conviction in favor of appeasement and disarmament will have gathered increasing momentum and then a new conference may well be able to accomplish much more than the present assembly. How much it can accomplish will depend in our opinion chiefly upon the course of domestic politics in China; but if the better Chinese can in the meantime put together any manner of trustworthy government the next conference would have a much better chance than the present one of relaxing the grip of the exploiters on China. By the time it assembles, both Japan and Great Britain will have come to a better realization of the strength and weakness of their position compared to that of an unharnessed and clearsighted United States.

French Policy and the Submarine

THE French are opposed to the outlawing of the submarine. They argue that the submarine, if used under a humane code of naval warfare, is just as legitimate a weapon as the capital ship. Of the two, is not the capital ship the more definitely committed to offence? No doubt. Is not the capital ship the more properly an instrument of the great nation for the oppression of the small? No doubt. Then why should Englishmen of every variety of political opinion denounce the French plans of submarine development? They say that in building submarines France is arming against England. If America chose to build submarines, would not the English say we were arming against them? They might, but they would know it was nonsense. For the last thing America wants is war with England. Let it be granted that our naval experts have England in mind when they work out their program, and that in certain technical exercises, England is premised as "the enemy." But technical exercises won't make a real enemy out of England, nor will the actual building of submarines. No one can point to a probability of issues arising between America and England that could draw the two nations into a war.

Is the same thing true of the relations between England and France? There are differences between the two nations in respect to the collection of the indemnity. There are also differences in policy in Asia Minor. But it is difficult to see in these differences a cause of dispute so serious as to lead statesmen of sound mind toward a war. Therefore most Americans, we believe, regard as somewhat hysterical the British opinion that the French submarine ambition presents an actual menace to England.

But before we conclude finally that the British fear of French submarines is altogether unfounded, we ought to make up our minds very clearly as to what the present policy of France is likely to lead to. Of course much depends on the future political complexion of the French government. If the French liberals, backed by labor and not opposed by the peasants should gain power

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and hold it, French policy would no doubt assume such a character as ought to reassure England that no aggression on the part of France need be feared. But the chances are as good, or better, that the French government will remain in the hands of parties at least as nationalistic and militarist as that of Briand, and very likely even more extreme. And nationalistic French opinion can see only one way of guaranteeing the future of France. That is by keeping Germany down and by building up the military power of France.

The military power of France is at present overwhelmingly superior to any power the Germans could develop. But the fact remains that the French population is much less than the German. Moreover, the disproportion is practically certain to become more marked with time, if Germany gets on her feet again. There are fewer people within the French boundaries than there were before the war, in spite of the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. Apparently the forces making for a decrease in population have been accentuated by the war. In Germany, on the other hand, a fairly rapid increase may confidently be predicted, unless the French can prevent it.

Here then is one point in any purely nationalistic French policy that may be definitely assumed. Keep Germany down. Exact from her the maximum possible tribute, and if this keeps her chronically poor and disorganized, and forces a heavy death rate and a heavy emigration, so much the better. If it prevents the recovery of central and eastern Europe, that will not materially injure France. For France is economically self-sufficing, and will best maintain her military strength by remaining self-sufficing.

Standing on guard over even a chronically poverty stricken and disordered Germany requires, however, large armies ever ready to execute ruthlessly the decisions of the French government. The armies conscripted from the peasants and workers of France can not be wholly satisfactory for this purpose. Such soldiers fought heroically to defend French soil against the invader, but would they be sufficiently hard to execute a systematic policy of crushing out every germ of civil progress in a neighboring people? That is not so certain; and besides, the French population would feel keenly the economic and social cost of the devotion of a large part of the young manhood of France to garrison duty. If such a policy is to be executed, there is need of a body of soldiers who stand in no close relation to the pacific and kindly masses of the French people, and who are in no danger of infection with working class internationalism.

Now, as everyone knows, France has in her vast African possessions a population from which she can draw soldiers exactly adapted to the requirements of a ruthless policy of keeping Germany down. Their adaptation consists precisely in the fact that they come out of a milieu alien to the conditions of Europe. On the soil of Europe, far from their own peoples, they would be soldiers and nothing else. If they had qualms about enforcing any order, they would have to suppress them. For no public sentiment would mitigate the measures that might be used to discipline them. We may leave out of account the fact of color, as well as the fact of difference in standards of civilization. Alienism is the one relevant characteristic of such a force.

There is not the least doubt that the political party now in power in France means to draw largely upon African forces for the defence of France. The contemplated reduction to eighteen months of the term of compulsory military service is accomplished by the authorization of an increase in African forces. The certain prospect of the future is an ever increasing number of African troops in service on European soil. And in the event of the outbreak of war in Europe, France would seek to rush hundreds of thousands of African troops across the Mediterranean. She must have, as it were, a lane which she can defend against any attack. And she can create such a lane only by building submarines in numbers sufficient to bar the British navy from the Mediterranean.

But it is not to be forgotten that the British can have very little sympathy with any policy designed to keep Germany permanently in poverty and disorder. The results of such a policy are disastrous to British commercial interests. Like the Americans, the British are subject to color prejudice, and will sooner or later find themselves revolted by the spectacle of a white population kept in chains by an army of colored conscripts. The French nationalistic policy is thus destined to come into conflict with the most powerful economic interests, as well as the deepest prejudices, of the English. Can the French then afford to leave the most important link in the chain of their policy, the lines of transportation from Africa, at the mercy of the British navy? Obviously not.

If France is to attain security through the supplementing of her man power by large drafts upon her African possessions, she must make sure of the line of transportation across the Mediterranean.

The French militarist party see a way by which France can hold her present position of security and power provided that England does not interfere with the development of their policy. They see in the submarine a weapon which would make it dangerous for England so to interfere. It is only

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in this sense that the French submarine policy is aimed against England. But it is a very real sense, for it is unthinkable that England will be able indefinitely to refrain from interfering. Is it an alarmist view that in a situation like this there is serious risk of another international conflict that may finish the destruction of European civilization? We do not think so.

Conferences vs. Alliances

MR. H. G. WELLS'S influence on public opinion in relation to the Conference is so much to the good that we dislike to emphasize any difference with him, but some recent admonitions and counsels which he has addressed to the American people demand the expression of a sharp dissent. These admonitions and counsels are discouraging to an American liberal. They indicate on the part of a man as friendly and as discerning as Mr. Wells a misunderstanding of what the American nation is half consciously and half unconsciously striving to do for the appeasement and amelioration of the world. They indicate a failure on his part to grasp what the strength of the American strategic position is and how an American government can best employ that strength for the common benefit.

In one of his recent articles he says, "It is as plain as daylight that Japanese liberal tendencies can be supported and the aggressive ambitions of Japanese imperialism can be restrained, that China can be saved for the Chinese and Eastern Siberia from foreign conquest provided America places herself unequivocally side by side with Great Britain and France in framing and sustaining a definite system of guarantees and prohibitions in Eastern Asia." Later he adds, "Similarly I do not see how any effectual disarmament is possible in Europe or how any dealing with the economic and financial situation can be possible unless America is prepared to bind itself in an alliance of mutual protection and accommodation with at least France, Germany, Britain and Italy, to sustain a similar series of conferences and adjustments. At the back of the French refusal to disarm there is a suppressed demand for a protective alliance." "This," declares Mr. Wells, "is an entirely reasonable demand." It is "an alliance not to entangle but to release."

These statements may look as plain as daylight to Mr. Wells, but to a great many Americans they will look on the contrary just about as luminous as a smoke-screen. In them Mr. Wells confuses two very different types of international cooperation. There is, in the first place, the old type of cooperation between states which were in a position to take advantage of other states and nations and which formed, in order to safeguard themselves against the consequences of their past and prospective behavior, a protective alliance. Such cooperation assumed the form of mutual guarantees which on paper always proposed to promote the peace of the world, but which were really intended to protect the contracting parties in the possession of some doubtful privilege or territory or against the possibly just resentment of another nation. This is what Americans mean by an entangling alliance. It is in order to avoid these entanglements that they have kept clear of European politics. The fear that Article X involved them in similar engagements accounts in part for their reluctance to enter the League of Nations. The same reluctance will prevent them from relishing the kind of protective alliances proposed by Mr. Wells. The New Republic sympathizes in this reluctance. If they are to surrender their isolation, it will be to participate in a different kind of international association.

The Washington Conference is a sufficiently good example of the different association of nations in which the United States can and should participate. The spirit, the purpose and the method of this gathering is opposed to the protective alliances advocated by Mr. Wells. Its members are not as yet asked and should not be asked to guarantee one another against anything. Their only obligations are to confer with one another about any decision which they adopt and to admit to the Conference all interested governments. A decision does not bind any party to the Conference unless it is unanimous. They merely agree to confer and they confer in order to agree. In as far as they do agree they will define their agreements in specific treaties which will subsequently be confirmed by legislation. If they do not agree the significance and consequences of the disagreement depend on its nature. A cleavage of the Conference into two antagonistic groups of apparently equal strength would be tantamount to complete failure and would render the method impossible. But if there were only one dissenting member of the Conference to a decision in which all the remaining conferees agree, the method would not necessarily fail. Just in so far as the majority was right and could submit to the world a sufficiently reasonable justification for its decision, it could morally and politically isolate the offender and so exercise coercion upon him. It could render him for the period of his offence a more or less complete outcast.

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As we understand it, President Harding's association of nations is an attempt to set up conferences of this kind as a new and promising agency of international legislation. The old agency of legislation was chiefly war, and the old alliances were expedients to enable their signatories to avoid the possible disadvantages and reap the possible benefits of international changes which it took a war to accomplish. The protective alliances desired by Mr. Wells are fundamentally a negative safeguard against war rather than a positive organization of peace. They would tend to perpetuate the instrument which they ostensibly propose to eradicate, precisely because they would tend in part to guarantee the status quo no matter how undesirable it might be. If the nations wish to get rid of armaments and war, it is not enough abstractly to agree to keep the peace. They must provide some machinery for accomplishing the international changes which wars have accomplished in the past. Alliances of the kind proposed by Mr. Wells are intended for the benefit of vested political interests which dread desirable changes and which seek to protect their possessions or privileges under the pretence of keeping the peace. In so far as the guarantees which they constitute were necessary, they would probably be undesirable.

If Mr. Wells answers that the guarantees of which he is in favor are not of this kind, we can only ask him to reconsider the meaning of his own words. The statements we have quoted, taken in connection with the existing situation in the Far East, are susceptible of only one meaning. The guarantees which he proposes are at best the guarantees of a slightly modified status quo. He is supporting the official position of his own government which seeks a substitute for the Anglo-Japanese alliance and which proposes in substance a new alliance with the same general purpose which would include the United States. This new alliance would, of course, contain the usual preamble about the independence and integrity of China and the sacred principle of the open door, but its object and effect would be to set up a guarantee by the United States and Great Britain of some fruits of the actual Japanese inroads on these principles, in return for a guarantee by the United States and Japan of the British possessions in the Far East. Mr. Wells omits from the proposed association the two peoples who are particularly entitled to be consulted about the political future of that region—the Siberians and the Chinese. The omission is illuminating. The contracting parties would consummate the alliance more or less at their expense.

As to the other suggested alliance for the "mutual protection" of France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy, that, we must admit, is a proposal which we find hard to understand. If Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy are now ready to enter into an alliance which would guarantee their existing possessions, relations and frontiers, why should they need the adhesion of the United States? Of course Russia would remain outside, but combined with the smaller states they need not fear Russia. There is only one sufficient reason for lugging in the United States. It is the disconcerting fact that the four great European powers are not willing to guarantee one another's possessions and boundaries. France knows the Germans will not in the long run acquiesce in certain possessions and privileges which she holds under the Treaty of Versailles. She demands the "protective alliance," of which Mr. Wells so warmly approves, for the purpose of guaranteeing to her the territorial and economic fruits of victory. As in the Far East, the guarantee is necessary chiefly because it is undesirable. If France would evacuate the Rhineland and the Saar Basin, remit part of the indemnity and enter into a mutually advantageous commercial treaty with Germany, she might reasonably ask for American protection; but in that case she would not need it. She could get it out of an alliance with the Germans themselves. By presenting her with unconditional protection, America would encourage her to dispense with the necessity of deserving it. It is a bargain of this kind which Mr. Wells proposes in the name of world appeasement and as "an alliance not to entangle but to release."

The alternative is cooperation by conference without guarantees and without any sanction except the possible isolation of the offender. This method, we have already admitted, will not work unless a substantial majority of the conferences can agree upon a desirable adjustment and unless they are ready to insist upon the acceptance of the adjustment as in itself a desirable act without paying for it by prejudicing some better adjustment in the future. In the case of the existing Conference, for instance, it would mean that the American government would not purchase an agreement to limit naval armaments by explicitly recognizing some part of the existing Japanese encroachments in China and Siberia. It would mean that, if Great Britain took the side of Japan and asked the American government to enter into such a bargain, the American government would courteously but firmly decline even though as the result of declining the Conference dissolved. Finally it would mean that if Great Britain acted with the United

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States rather than with Japan, and Japan insisted on the bargain, they would permit Japan to withdraw from the Conference rather than purchase temporary unanimity by guaranteeing undesirable possessions and privileges. Inasmuch as such guarantees could not survive without military or naval protection, they would merely confirm the old partnership between power and injustice and the old antagonism between order and justice.

But, the objector will answer, if America and Great Britain permit the Japanese to walk out of the Conference, they turn her, angry and unmuzzled, loose upon the helpless peoples of the Far East. They will positively invite the hostility, the armament and the war which they seek to avoid. Before accepting this consequence, consider what the facts of the situation would then be. If the United States and Great Britain isolate Japan and Japanese policy remains aggressively independent, the Japanese military caste may, it is true, take the bit in its teeth and run amuck. France under similar provocation may adopt an equally ugly and dangerous course in Europe. But the nations which are honestly seeking appeasement without further war cannot create what they are seeking without taking a risk at some point in the process. If they remain cool, firm, united and resourceful, the risk which they run will be slight compared to the risk which will threaten the offender. If Japan walks out of the Conference, she will find herself alone and friendless in an Asia which she has outraged and offended and which she is not strong enough to subdue. France under similar conditions will find herself almost alone in a Europe which her policy is rending to pieces. Neither of them is powerful enough to play a lone hand under such hazardous conditions and both the Japanese and Frenchmen know it. Their only chance of keeping what they have got is to force other nations to guarantee the major part of it by threatening to run amuck. But this threat is really a big bluff. The answer to it is not to yield, but to call the bluff. We do not assert that the time has already come to insist on a showdown. Indeed we believe it has not come. But eventually the time is likely to come when the nations which seek general appeasement and recovery will have to ask Japan and France to lay their cards on the table. Once they are obliged to expose their hands, they will discover what the penalty is for a poker player who bets his fortune on a royal flush all but one card. Pending this consummate moment, we devoutly trust the American people will not follow the advice of Mr. Wells and guarantee any part of the status quo in Europe and Asia which these nations are striving to preserve.

Mr. Vanderlip's Plan

WHAT we shall do with our claims upon our former associates in the Great War is a question to which every one has given thought, and will have to give more thought in the future. Shall we collect them? We can't, in the near future at any rate. Shall we incontinently cancel them? We should receive but grudging thanks for such action. Shall we use our power either to cancel or to insist on ultimate payment as a means to induce Europe to set its house in order, through disarmament, the cessation of currency inflation, or the intelligent disposition of the German indemnity?

All these suggestions Mr. Vanderlip considers and rejects. The debts are morally binding: our debtors have not the least right to demand their cancellation. They can not pay now, and unless conditions much improve, the possibility of their paying finally is remote. Moreover, if they could pay, and set about doing it, the goods in which they paid would be a terrible drag upon our markets. We should get hopelessly entangled in European affairs without doing much good, if we tried to use the debts to effect a reform in European international relations. On this point the New Republic wishes to record certain reservations. We foresee possibilities for putting the Allied debts to important uses when the nations meet, as sooner or later they must, to discuss international financial conditions. But what concerns us here is Mr. Vanderlip's own plan for disposing of the Allied debts. It is a novel plan, and as might be inferred from its authorship, at once shrewd, imaginative and generous.

What Mr. Vanderlip proposes is to insist on payment of interest and principal of the debt, but instead of the transmission of payment to our own treasury, its application as a revolving fund to the purposes of European rehabilitation. Reinvest it in Europe, especially in eastern Europe, in hydro-electric development, in the improvement of means of communication, in modernizing agricultural technique, and whatever else may give the stimulus necessary to realize the immense potentialities of that rich but demoralized territory. Mr. Vanderlip would by no means confine his investments to enterprises offering a direct pecuniary return. The founding of colleges and technical and scientific institutions he regards as one of the most profitable uses to which such moneys could be put. And he is no doubt right. The European market is for America an asset incomparably more valuable than the Allied debts; the progress of European culture offers in the long run

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promise of benefits to America superior to anything we could buy with the money we could collect from our debtors. Economically and morally, investments in European scientific and technical progress would be exceedingly profitable, in the end.

It is not possible to quarrel with the spirit of Mr. Vanderlip's proposals. For Europe collectively we should perform a far greater service if we collected the debt and applied the proceeds as he suggests than we could perform by simple cancellation. In cancelling the debt, or in leaving it, as now, in the air, with no item in the budgets of our debtors corresponding to interest on it, we simply leave the debtor nations free to apply the sums to war preparations or to other wasteful uses characteristic of governments. It would be highly beneficial to the citizens of France or of the British Commonwealth if trustees for the American claims could wrest away part of the treasury receipts and apply them to fruitful uses, either within the national boundaries or in other states of the European society. It would be highly beneficial if it could be effected. But could it be?

The French budget is far from a satisfactory balance, without making any allowance for the payment of interest on France's debt to us. The Italian budget is in still worse case. As for the Polish and the Jugoslav budgets, they are so hopelessly unbalanced that everyone has stopped taking note of them. The British budget is in not too easy a condition, but it is conceivable that the British financiers could manage to raise the sums required of them under the Vanderlip plan.

It would, however, be difficult to persuade any of these governments to restrict other expenditures in order to place funds to the account of the debt trustees, even if all those funds were to be spent at home, on projects that would not otherwise be undertaken publicly. But as for inducing France to set funds aside for developments in Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania, Rumania, not to mention Russia; how is it to be done? After all, foreign exchange is foreign exchange: to make payments in eastern Europe would affect the franc about as adversely as to make payments in the United States. The British are more interested in the development of eastern Europe than any other of the Allies. Yet they would view with misgivings the decline in sterling that would inevitably attend the adoption of Mr. Vanderlip's plan.

Shall we then say of this proposal that it is good in spirit but unhappily incapable of practical application? No. We should have made great progress toward a sane policy on the debts if once we recognized that whatever can be paid on them in the next decade cannot be remitted to America, but must be applied to European needs. As an isolated transaction, it is unlikely that the sums due from England, France and Italy can be made to flow into eastern Europe, where the need for them is greatest. But there is no reason why they should not be handled in connection with the German indemnity. England and France have claims upon German productive power, which can only furnish goods, goods which to a large extent France does not want and England can take only at a severe strain on her own industry. Why not divert German energy to the development of the East?

That is at any rate a practical possibility. Assume that the nations have met and have faced squarely the problems of militarism, inflation and foreign exchange, and the excesses of the indemnities. In striving for an intelligent settlement of these problems America might find it expedient to offer cancellation, or she might see the wisdom of abating in some measure her claims upon the Allied treasuries. Better a smaller sum that can be paid than one so large as to paralyze every effort toward payment, is a good principle in national as well as in private finance. Whatever sum remained, as a debt to be currently honored, might then be discharged by orders on Germany disburdened of so much of the indemnity as serves no other purposes than those of economic suffocation. Germany has excess productive power. France and England have claims upon it. We have claims upon them which we can not profitably collect directly. But they place in our hands the end of a chain by which we may be able to couple German energy with the needs of eastern Europe.

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The Accumulation of Capital

OUR capital accumulation for the current year will amount to more than eight billion dollars. Nine months ago the talk was all of the great need for funds, of the scarcity of capital, of high interest rates, which could only be lowered as a result of economy and savings. And now the interest rate has been falling for some months. The concern of bankers and bond houses is no longer to find a market, but to get a sufficient supply of reasonably stable issues. As fast as such securities appear they are absorbed with avidity. High surtaxes, excess profits taxes, the disheveled state of European industry and politics, seem powerless to check the flow of funds to the investment market. Even the experienced investment bankers are astounded at the existence of a demand for investment securities which can be satisfied only by raising prices and thus reducing the rate of return.

The assertion that our national savings amount, in this year of depression, to eight billion dollars will not pass unquestioned. Capital is created by producing more than we consume, and our national savings are the excess of our production over our consumption. Can it be that with mining and manufacturing producing at less than seventy per-cent of their capacity, we are creating in excess of what we are consuming an amount which would extinguish the national debt in three years? Even if we allow for the change in the price level, the amount here named is one-half the total product of either Germany or England in a pre-war year, and exceeds by a liberal margin the combined savings of these two nations.

The determination of our savings involves less estimate for 1921 than for previous years. A larger part of the capital created during this year has come to the security market than ever before. The published figures of the financial journals show that the investing public of this country is absorbing approximately three billion dollars of industrial, state, and municipal securities in this year. This is after deducting the securities put out to refund old issues falling due. The small corporations issue a large volume of securities which is not tabulated by these financial papers. The total figures for the capital stock and bonds of corporations outstanding are not available for every year; but when they have been compiled they have always shown that the issues which come to the notice of the financial journals are far less than the total amount of securities put out. All told four and one-half billions of industrial, municipal, and government investments must have been issued and absorbed in the year 1921. State and municipal governments alone have issued more than one billion dollars of such securities.

There can be no doubt concerning the accumulation of the capital with which these were purchased. That portion of the savings fund at least can be ascertained, with a negligible margin of error. It is possible to determine with almost the same degree of certainty the amount of our excess production which has been exported to foreign nations, primarily Europe. Our exports will exceed our imports by more than two billion dollars this year. In return for this balance of trade we are receiving over eight hundred million dollars of gold, silver, and U. S. paper currency. The foreign nations are sending us over half a billion of new government and corporate securities which they have issued. We have repurchased a substantial amount of American securities which had been acquired by foreign investors in years past. These items combined approximate one and one-half billion dollars. In addition the remittances of immigrants and the amounts which we have sent to Europe for relief will total another four hundred million dollars. These amounts, too, are a part of the excess of our production over our consumption; they have been saved by our people just as much as if they had been sent abroad in return for foreign securities.

When we add the capital which was brought to the market and invested in securities, and the savings which were exported to Europe in return for gold, securities, and for relief, we arrive at a total of more than six billion dollars. This portion of our savings has passed through some channel, such as the investment market or ports of entry, where it has been recorded with a high degree of accuracy. There can be no reasonable doubt of the accumulation of the capital used for these purposes. The sums which can be thus definitely fixed are large, but they do not comprehend the whole of our national savings.

Prominent among the savings which do not come to the security market for investment are the profits retained and reinvested in their businesses by corporations. These fluctuate widely with the variations of production and profit. The National Bureau of Economic Research estimates that these savings approximated four billion dollars in 1916. In that year the earnings of corporations are much

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reduced, but dividend payments have been curtailed in much smaller degree. The earnings which these concerns reinvest in their own plant or in the payment of their debts will only slightly exceed half a billion dollars. This sum, then, must be added to the foregoing amount.

A large part of our industry is not under the corporate form of organization. This is especially true of wholesale and retail trade and of professional activities. Agriculture, with six and one-half million establishments and with ten billion dollars of product even in this year of low prices, has come under the corporate form of organization to only a negligible extent. But these businesses have absorbed capital, as well as those organized under the corporate form. They have, however, provided their own capital through savings to a greater degree than corporations. The latter organizations distribute the major part of their earnings as interest and dividends in a year like 1921. They then secure the new capital which they need for expansion or for payment of debts by issuing new securities. Not so with the business that is still carried on by individuals or partnerships. Here the owner relies to a large degree upon the savings which he makes out of the returns of his business. The profits of trade and of agriculture have been comparatively small, and the savings from this source do not greatly exceed one billion dollars. Some will be inclined to doubt whether they are as large as this, but the fact that farmers and merchants had incurred indebtedness to an unusual degree has put pressure upon them to save even from their reduced income. Those who have observed conditions in the rural districts report that the farmer is not buying much this autumn. The farming industry is the only one which has not reduced its production because of depression. If he is not buying he must be saving to some degree. We are forced to the conclusion, then, that the savings of agriculture and of businesses not under the corporate form are one billion dollars. They have been reinvested in these businesses, and have not come to the capital market. They have, however, played an important part in bringing about a reduction in our bank loans.

One other measure of capital accumulation and investment must be considered to complete the picture. Perhaps the largest single demand for capital is for the construction of buildings. The total amount expended for this purpose within a year is far above two billion dollars. Much of this building was carried on with funds derived from the sale of corporate and government securities and from the savings of corporations and other businesses. But a large part of our building operations is of another nature. It consists of residential construction. The capital with which these operations are carried on consists mostly of savings of our wage- and salary-earning classes. Those capital accumulations which find their way into the savings banks and which pass through building and loan associations go largely into these building operations. Real estate is still the standard investment, too, of the lower middle classes. Building statistics indicate that we must allow one billion dollars for capital invested in this manner.

A summary of the evidence in support of the statement that we have accumulated eight billion dollars of capital this year would include the following items:

Domestic securities purchased (exclusive of refunding):	
Corporate securities	$3,200,000,000
State, municipal, and U. S. govt.	1,300,000,000
	$4,500,000,000
Capital exported, as measured by:	
Gold, silver, and U. S. currency imported	800,000,000
Foreign government and other securities purchased	500,000,000
American securities repurchased..	100,000,000
Immigrant remittances and foreign relief	400,000,000
	$1,800,000,000
Corporate surplus reinvested.....	500,000,000
Income saved by agriculture and business not corporate.....	1,000,000,000
Building operations other than public and corporate.....	1,000,000,000
Total Savings.....	$8,800,000,000

Even if one makes considerable deductions from one or more of these items on account of excessive estimates, the total must still be over $8,000,000,000.

All the items in the first two groups above except the immigrants' remittances are saved for the most part from the incomes of the rich and the moderately well-to-do. These are our professional investors in the security market. Practically all the people of this group also employ life insurance as a means of capital accumulation. In 1920 the income of the old line life insurance companies exceeded their expenditures by over six hundred million. When we take into consideration the portion of the payments of death losses which is reinvested, the institution of life insurance accounts for almost a billion dollars of capital accumulation a year. The total accumulation by this means has almost trebled within the last decade.

The chief source of the incomes of these classes

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consists of the dividend payments of corporations and of the interest payments of corporations and government. Anyone who has studied the composition of the incomes reported to the Treasury for tax purposes knows that by far the larger part of all incomes above $20,000 consists of these items. For some groups of tax payers it runs as high as ninety percent.

While the profits of corporations after paying interest charges in 1921 will be only one-half as large as they were at the peak in 1917, the dividends which they are distributing will be only twenty-five percent less. The total dividends of that year exceeded those of 1921 by less than one and one-half billion. The interest charges have not decreased; on the contrary they have increased. The borrowings of the corporations have grown rapidly during the past four years, and interest rates have had a phenomenal rise. Between 1917 and 1918 alone the amount of interest paid by corporations as shown by the "Statistics of Income" increased half a billion dollars.

The total payments of corporations on this account in 1921 exceeded those of 1917 by a billion and a half, thus offsetting the decrease in dividends distributed. The figures for dividend and interest payments for certain corporations as compiled by the Journal of Commerce show average monthly payments of $148,000,000 in 1913, $199,000,000 for 1917, and $290,000,000 thus far this year. They contain about $90,000,000 per month of corporate interest on United States bonds in the current year. After allowing for these we still have monthly distributions of interest and dividends in this year equal to 1917 when dividends were at a maximum.

The total payments of dividends and interest by corporations this year will approximate seven billion dollars. A liberal deduction must be made from this for inter-corporate payments, such as interest paid to banks; and a further deduction for the interest and dividend payments to life insurance companies. But such deductions cannot exceed two billion dollars. This leaves a net of five billions paid by corporations to individuals. In addition the federal government distributes approximately one billion dollars in interest, while the state, municipal, and foreign governments distribute four hundred million dollars more. When these are summarized they amount to a total of $7,300,000,000 when the savings through life insurances are included.

A deduction must be made from this amount to allow for the fact that the government levies its normal income and surtaxes almost exclusively upon the individuals who receive the bulk of these incomes. But those taxes have never yet equalled $1,300,000,000, and with the reduction of incomes this year and the shifting of investments to tax-free securities they will not exceed $1,000,000,000. The interest distributed by the federal government is, therefore, adequate to offset in its entirety these taxes.

The fund available for the accumulation of capital which comes to the security market has, therefore, been only slightly reduced by the forces of industrial depression. The great reduction in savings is found in the surplus of corporations and in the savings which farmers and other business men are making out of income. There are evidences, however, that even here there is a substantial amount of saving. The reduction in the loans of all banks, national and state, for the year will be nearly four billion dollars, while the decrease in Federal Reserve notes outstanding amounts to another billion. In part this has been accomplished by corporations which have floated securities and have used the proceeds to pay their bank loans, but in large measure this reduction has been effected by farmers and other business men.

The capital which has gone into the construction of residences has been furnished mostly by the laborers and the lower middle class. All students of the investment situation have been amazed at the manner in which savings deposits have been maintained and even increased during this year of depression. The laboring classes accumulated savings at a rapid rate during the years of war prosperity. The habit then contracted has been stimulated by the threat of unemployment. Without doubt, too, the eighteenth amendment and the absence of the saloon have played an important part in increasing the savings of the great mass of our common people.

These facts concerning capital accumulation indicate that the industrial depression with its curse of unemployment and its curtailment of production, has not impeded seriously the flow of investment funds to the security market. At least, they are still so large that the competition for suitable investment for these funds is reducing the rate of interest and will continue to do so for months to come. It seems clear, too, that the effect of taxes in curbing capital accumulation has been overestimated. Certainly such a state of the investment market must raise a question in the mind of any impartial investigator concerning the effect of taxes in discouraging savings. Finally, there is reason to believe that plans for the reconstruction of

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Europe and for the salvaging of western civilization need not fail for want of capital. America can meet the pressing needs of the world for funds, if only Europe will adjust its political and industrial institutions so that they will command our confidence.

DAVID FRIDAY.

Albertism

ONE day, when I was quite a little girl, I heard my Grandmother say to a neighbor, "You can say what you like about Mr. Brown, but Mrs. Brown wears the pants."

That was strange, I thought. I looked across the street, expecting to see Mr. Brown suddenly attired in petticoats. But he was raking leaves in the front yard, wearing his ordinary old clothes. I hung around, waiting for Mrs. Brown's return from High School, where she was the principal. Bitter, bitter was my disappointment to discover that she had on her familiar, greenish-black serge skirt. My Grandmother had told a fib or perhaps she was just talking in the funny way grown-ups have, when they don't want children to understand.

It was some years before I could interpret Grandmother's symbolic remark, and after I did, the Browns remained in my memory. There was something droll about them. Everybody made fun of them; and while some people were sorry for Mr. Brown because he was short and his wife was tall, and he stayed at home, and she taught school, nevertheless, they laughed. The womanish man and the mannish woman have always been one of the world's best jokes. I laughed, too, until lately. But having met Edward, I am beginning to wonder if perhaps we have all been making light of what is really a serious problem. Perhaps, when Nature shuffles the cards, and deals out human characteristics, it isn't as ludicrous as we have supposed, when they fall, not according to sex, but by disposition and temperament. It was Edward who first set me thinking.

Edward came to me highly recommended as the best day's worker in the city. He was a small, apologetic Englishman, with a thin, sensitive face and hands, as scarred by housework as a woman's.

"He really is a marvel," my friend assured me. "You mustn't be prejudiced against him just because he's doing a woman's work."

At first, I must confess that I did have, not exactly a prejudice, but a feeling of doubt. The powerful Maggie who had ministered to me for so long, had been utterly inefficient, to be sure, but I always believed that being a woman, she could have taken care of my apartment, if she had wanted to. I was always hoping that she would want to. And Edward was only a man. Could he clean, dust, wash, iron and attend to the thousand and one details that make up a day's work?

On the evening of his first day, I knew. The apartment was clean, the pictures hung straight, some small pieces of laundry, beautifully ironed, were laid carefully across the couch. There seemed to be no toll of breakage. Best of all, the day had been painless, as far as I was concerned. Edward glided about; he did not groan, exclaim or protest; he worked as if he liked it, and he spared me all the details of his neighbor's ailments and domestic affairs.

It was several weeks before I became really acquainted with Edward. His silence was almost taciturn. I learned later that he was habitually on the defensive, as uncomfortable as is a woman who first engages in an occupation which has previously belonged only to men. Yet when he discovered that I was pleased, even enthusiastic about his work, he became positively expansive. My appreciation seemed to heal a wound of spirit, remove some old insult from his heart.

He had always been fond of housework, he explained, and his wife didn't like it at all. Before she was married she made shirtwaists in a factory. After she was married, she was miserable, staying at home and doing the housework. She loved to run a power machine and she enjoyed being with other people. Edward's hatred of a factory still emphasized his speech. Machinery always got out of order when he ran it, he loathed the noise and confusion, and the talking. Particularly the talking. "Parrots!" he said, "all parrots—screeching, yelling, chattering—never quiet a minute." For quite a while, when they began keeping house, he went to the factory and Mary stayed at home. They were both unhappy. She couldn't seem to do anything right, the food was burned, the flat was in disorder and she was always tired.

One day, they decided to change places. He stayed at home, took care of the baby, made the house clean and was at the door to greet her when she returned. It worked like a charm. There was not a family in the whole tenement as happy as they. Then, the children grew up and went away, and one day, his wife died and he was left all alone. After all his years in the home, he was like a widow. He didn't know what he should do, or how he could earn a living.

It was by a sort of miracle that his career unfolded. The friend who sent him to me, came to his door one day. She was looking for a woman

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named Quinn, a laundress and day's cleaner. Edward told her there was no such person in the building. She seemed greatly disappointed as she explained:

"I have just come back from the country, and I must have someone to clean my house and attend to the children's laundry before school opens."

The words came to Edward like an inspiration. "I will do it for you," he cried. And from that day, he became a houseworker. "Only," he added with not a little bitterness, "lots of women don't want a man doing their work—sometimes I have to go for fifty cents a day less, just to have enough places. That ain't right. Because I do it just as good as a woman does, and some say I do better."

It was Edward's grievance over his rights that gave me a new point of view about men's work. Knowing him has made me realize how many injustices to men exist in the world. In suffrage days, I thought that women had preempted all the inequalities. Now that we have won the vote, and so many occupations are open to us, I begin to see the need of a new campaign for human freedom. This time, for men.

Women have achieved, at last, the privilege of going out of the home. But did you ever hear of a man who was really permitted the full privilege of going into it? By no means. The home is still woman's sphere even though she leaves it at will and claims the whole world as her hunting ground. John Doe may carry his wailing infant up and down the hall, of course, and sift the ashes and beat the rugs. He may even wipe the dishes on a Thursday night or when his wife is tired. But he does it under Jane Doe's direction and with a kind of temporary permit. He doesn't really belong; he's just an extra.

Outside of the home he may sew as a tailor, run a washing machine in a laundry or cook in a bakery. He may be a chef in a big hotel, but he is doing it as a business, not a homey, woman's task. If by chance, a man prefers the sheltered, individualistic, domestic sort of work, society is against him and considers him unsexed. So, a man like Edward is a pioneer, just as were the first women doctors or lawyers or engineers. He is living against the same kind of obstacles, trying to get into the home as were the first women who tried to get out.

It is strange how everybody is against the domestic man. Consider the case of the Margaret Winstons. Harold Winston is like Edward in disposition, except that he is the product of people who have never done their own housework. He is not lazy. He likes to be busy about many things, but they are homey things. This does not mean that he is effeminate. He's a good out-door person, plays tennis and swims, and is a great camper. In fact, it was on canoe trips and camping expeditions that he learned to cook so well. He really is a specialist in food. He can plan menus, carry out a scheme of floral decoration, manage any kind of a servant, black, white or Japanese, and he is a perfect host. No one ever gives such delightful dinners and teas. In short, Harold has just that genius for home-making that all women are supposed to possess by instinct and almost as seldom do.

Margaret is one of those women who has no knack at all, in household ways. Her rooms always looked like a series of offices, before she was married. She wore tailor-made clothes, she bought tailor-made furniture, she tried to run an apartment as if it were a factory efficiency department. She did not know what comfort was until she married Harold; she merely existed in a house.

Now Harold had never had a paying occupation. He had tried a number of things: interior decoration, semi-amateur theatricals, running an arts and craftsy florist shop. Nothing he did ever succeeded and he was always in debt to his father. Margaret, on the other hand, could always get a good job. When she met Harold she was making a large salary as employment manager for a big corporation. She wanted to keep on with her work, but also she wanted companionship and a real home. Nobody knows by what process matters were arranged, but they now have a charming house which Harold manages, and Margaret works as she did before they were married. It seems as if both had found their proper vocations, and they are blissfully happy.

The disturbing factor is that Harold's social position is not pleasant. His men friends rather despise him, they call him Margaret's "wife." And Margaret's friends believe him to be a sort of grafter. Whereas, the truth is that he is a hard working and contributing member of the partnership. If Margaret were giving up her life to making him happy, and herself miserable, everybody would approve. But because he stays at home and plays what is usually the woman's part, no one except Margaret really appreciates him. And she is so happy that he is satisfied to go on, proud, in a certain way, that he can do so much for her.

I wonder if Edward's situation and Harold's are not typical of others. It may be that all over the country, men in offices, in factories, and perhaps in no business at all, are unhappy and unfitted for life outside of the home. Tradition forces them to keep on, of course, just as many a woman with her talents suppressed by dish-washing and cooking, foregoes a longed-for business or professional

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career. With women, however, the worst part of the struggle is over. Society concedes them the right to engage in almost any occupation from arctic exploration to making steel bolts. Their adjustments are now chiefly personal. But men, poor souls, have not exactly been forced out of the home. They have never been let into it, on equal terms, and it may require strenuous campaigning to give any of them the right to stay in it.

It would be strange, wouldn't it, if men had to struggle to get into the home, as women did to get out of it! Perhaps, after a long period of pioneers like Edward and Harold, an enlightened and determined man will feel a call to leadership. He will form clubs where men can talk over their wrongs and tell their experiences trying to gain a foothold in the home. One can picture how, after a while, members of these clubs would decide to have a big campaign, and there would be speakers at the street corners and mass meetings. And one day, when a great many men were awake to their wrongs, there would be a great parade.

One can see them, marching thousands strong, wearing white suits and sashes of blue or yellow, while women stand along the curb shouting encouraging words and cheering them along. They will have banners, with all kinds of legends. "We Vote. Let Us Decide How We Shall Work," "Japanese Men Cook. Why not American Men?" "We Demand a Place in the Home." There will be sections, too, composed of men already in home-making occupations, housekeepers, cooks, day's workers. And floats will have tableaux showing men in simple household tasks like making grape jelly, or putting laundry to soak or peeling potatoes.

Naturally, some men will object to opening up the home to their brothers. Because they prefer to be out in the world, they will insist that all men do the same thing. Probably there will be Anti societies eager to prove that it is contrary to man's nature to be in the home, that their grandfathers had no such notions. People will begin to write pamphlets on the sphere and duties of men, and everybody will be debating the subject and taking sides. Then, of course, there will be women who resent any infringement upon their traditional activities, and this may lead to the formation of a political party, which women may not join, pledged to defeat all women candidates for office who refuse to consider the justice of men's demands.

It seems almost certain to me that the next great movement will be Albertism. Victorianism has passed but there will not be true equality in the world until Albertism comes in. It is strange that Queen Victoria, whose name suggests all that is clinging and dependent in women, should herself have given the historic precedent for a new attitude toward men. Her history affords an almost complete program of masculinism.

Albertism begins with a man's right to be wooed. In royal circles this has always been conceded. No woman's magazine has ever debated the question "Should a queen propose?" A queen does not have to hang back modestly, offering only such gifts as books, flowers and an occasional box of candy. After she has cast an appraising eye over the whole masculine world, she says, "I'll take this one," and she does. If, as the French sociologist Tarde says, customs pass down from the higher to the lower walks of life, the privileges always accorded to queens may ultimately be granted to Mary and Jane. Of course there must be, in fact we know there are, many men in the world too timid to take the initiative in mating, men who would gladly be wooed but who haven't the egotism or courage to do it for themselves. What a relief for them to wait quietly, knowing that some day a woman will come to them and say, "You are mine!"

After Albert was won by Victoria, there was no question of her giving up a career. His place was in the home, not on the throne, and nobody criticized him for keeping his place. He was not expected to be a wage earner, either. Instead, he was given a generous allowance. There seemed to be some difficulty about what he should be called. Mr. Wettin would not do, apparently. After this was settled and he was established as Prince Consort, he proved his ability to make Victoria happy by a long and honored service to the royal home, their children and England.

If Monsieur Tarde is right, and customs do come down from the aristocracy, Albertism will one day be permitted in the ordinary walks of life. Men, as well as women will follow their temperaments and abilities, rather than some traditional idea of what they ought to do. If they are shy, retiring and domestic, no one will blame them if they stay in the home, provided they make good in home-making, and can bring up children, cook and sew. Instead of belittling their talents, as we do today, we shall value them and try to develop them. In such a time, schools will be established where men may study the arts of the household. And we shall make no social discrimination against them. Under Albertism, a man with domestic inclinations will not have to slink along through life with the apologetic air of a man in a woman's club.

FLORENCE GUY WOOLSTON.

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Japan's Chance and Choice

LONG before the opening of the Washington Conference the wiseacres were sure that Japan would play the rôle of chief trouble maker. Most Americans who have got beyond the phrase "a wonderful little people" seem to have arrived at the phrase, "a demoniac little people," or its equivalent. They viewed the Conference with a sort of confident pessimism, waiting for Japan to exhibit her predestined misbehavior. Burke, who once confessed that he knew not how to indict a whole people, could have learned twice over in America during the past few weeks.

What is there to be said on the pessimists' side? First of all there is the fact that as regards Far Eastern and Pacific questions, the Conference is chiefly called because of Japanese wrongdoing in the Orient. "A Conference to Make Japan Behave Herself—Also the Rest of Us" is a title that would fit the facts. To confirm this, we need only note that of all the great powers Japan came most unwillingly into the Conference. She would not have wept to see it cancelled at the last moment. She was very well satisfied with the way things were going in the Orient; and she knew that whatever alteration was made in the status quo would be at her expense. During recent years, and particularly during the four years of the Great War when the attention of the world was fixed on Europe, Japan did a number of things on the continent of Asia which certainly do not measure up to the requirements of current international morality as it is preached among the western powers—however much these Japanese performances may resemble those of the occidental nations in the not-distant past. Even Japan herself did not expect to retain in their entirety her recent gains on the continent.

But it is as hard for a nation which is "on the make" to give up territory and concessions, as for an individual to accept a lowered standard of living. This is especially true of a country which is seeking to raise itself from a second class to a first class power when its economic position does not justify such an effort. Japan is often compared to the Germany of 1913; a more accurate comparison, it seems to me, would be to the Germany of Bismarck's time. It is in these periods of intense national effort that racial characteristics are most clearly exhibited; patriotism then becomes the fierce loyalty felt by members of a football team fighting an uphill fight. And this patriotism is the sort most dangerous to outsiders who obstruct, or seem to obstruct, the imperial destiny.

It must have been with anxious heart, then, that the ruling class in Japan saw its delegates sail away for the Conference. This is not the place to recite again the economic necessities which, as it is alleged, impel Japan to seek an outlet upon the continent of Asia and to demand suzerainty over the waters of the eastern Pacific. Her needs have been amply exploited recently in the American press. It is worth remembering, however, that to Great Britain and the United States the Chinese question is interesting, but not vital. Both nations could survive without any access to China, if they had to. But to Japan the matter is one of life and death. Her delegates firmly believe that on the skill with which they play their cards depends, not merely a greater or less degree of prosperity for their country, but the question of its continued existence as a great power.

Far more than any other delegation, the Japanese representatives in Washington live "at the end of a cable." The ultimate decision on every matter of importance is made in Tokio. Because of the difference in time, the inadequacy of communication, and the deliberateness of diplomats, the usual period required to get a reply from Japan is four days—a fact which has seriously hampered the Conference.

The delegates, however, are by no means mere puppets. They are among the most interesting and vivid personalities on display in Washington. First in popular favor comes Vice-Admiral Baron Tomosaburo Kato, Minister of Marine—a Japanese edition of Colonel House, lean, brown, imperturbable, with close-cropped hair, shrewd eyes, a well-controlled mouth, and sinewy long hands with which he makes brief gestures of decision as he talks. There is nothing "modern" or "liberal" about Admiral Kato. He represents the eighteenth century—not of Japan, of course, but of western Europe.

Neatly complementary to him is Prince Iyesato Tokugawa, president of the House of Peers, round-faced and smiling. An aristocrat of treble distillation, a man for whom democracy must be an alien and incomprehensible thing, he is nevertheless invariably genial even when suffering at the hands of American reporters. More than any other member of his group, Prince Tokugawa reminds one of the Japan of our old happy notions—the Japan of contented babies, cherry festivals and boiling hot baths.

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Baron Kijuro Shidehara, ambassador to the United States, an intelligent diplomatist and sympathetic student of American institutions, unfortunately fell ill during the first days of the conference. His place was taken by Manasao Hanihara, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, a great favorite with the American journalists because of his occidental mannerisms. They do not, I should say, prevent him from remaining completely oriental in his mind.

It is an object lesson in eastern psychology to attend one of the press conferences at which, each evening, a member of the Japanese delegation meets journalists of all nations. You tramp down endless miles of corridor in the new Navy building, passing a Marine on guard every half mile or so. At last you reach a room much too small for the hundred-odd newspapermen jammed into it. At one end of a long table sits Kato or Tokugawa, flanked by Ichihashi, the young American-trained translator, and by the ubiquitous Hanihara. These conferences are quite in the old school of secret diplomacy; when Japan really has anything to say she puts it out in writing. Baron Kato is asked, perhaps, whether matters are progressing satisfactorily? There is a brief rattle of machine-gun Japanese as he confers with Hanihara; and the translator announces that by a gentleman's agreement no comment is to be added to the official communiqué—which usually contains nothing whatever. You have a feeling that if the Baron were asked whether he liked boiled onions the same reply—after a careful consultation with Hanihara—would be forthcoming.

It is true, as a Japanese liberal remarked the other day, that Japan's outlook in international affairs is still that of the eighteenth century. For that matter, so was everybody else's, until a few decades ago. Since the war most of Europe—and France most of all—has been forced back into eighteenth century thinking, though no doubt only temporarily. If Japan does the twentieth century thing from eighteenth century motives, what American who has lately seen his country do the eighteenth century thing from eighteenth century motives, can afford to sneer?

But is Japan doing the twentieth century thing? As these lines are written it is too early to pass judgments except to say that in the first three weeks of the Conference her performance fell about half way between the expectation of her enemies and the hopes of her friends.

Two big moments the Conference has had, when anything might have been possible; and at both, the golden opportunity was neglected. When Premier Briand painted in such detail the menace of unrepentant Germany to France, some ingenuous hearers believed he would conclude with: "But in spite of these dangers, for the sake of humanity France is ready to take the risk: she will disarm!" If he had done so, who knows what might have followed? The other occasion was when Admiral Baron Kato followed Mr. Balfour in replying to the Hughes proposals. He accepted them "in principle," it is true; but he did so in phrases which not even the fiery delivery of the translator could make other than cold and reluctant. A full and generous response from Japan at this moment might have changed the whole course of the Conference's history. Instead, Kato's statement seemed by its chill to presage the brief written declaration which came only a few hours later, that "under certain circumstances" Japan would ask that the 5-5-3 naval ratio be altered.

Mr. Balfour's acceptance on behalf of England was also halting and cool; but there was a difference which is itself one of the notable facts of the Conference. When Great Britain accepted, everyone at once assumed that she meant it; when Japan accepted, everyone asked, What does she mean? The gulf between the two nations at this point could not have been greater if the Anglo-Japanese alliance had never existed. Indeed, in the work of the Conference thus far, Great Britain in general has stood with America on every important point; not with her "ally," Japan. The story of British policy in the Conference is a long and complicated one; but no one need be accused of ingenuousness for saying that at this moment blood has proved itself thicker than treaties.

Indeed, Japan should heed well the lesson to be derived from the French incident. In the midst of protestations from Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour that France was not in a position of moral isolation, it became horribly evident that she was in just exactly that position. A Japan unwilling to yield the decent minimum on the continent of Asia must be prepared to break with both England and the United States. Physically they could not hurt her much even in case of war; but her rejection from the sisterhood of nations to a moral isolation incomparably greater than that of France must mean the end of her ambition to be a "first class power." No matter how much she might then batten on Asia she could not rid herself of the stigma of the outcast—a stigma which would be worth many battalions to China in the inevitable struggle which would ensue for freedom from the Japanese grip.

Washington. BRUCE BLIVEN.

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French Frenzied Finance

SUDDENLY France, after closing her eyes for three years to the truth about reparations, discovered that her debtor was bankrupt. Suddenly the Quai d'Orsay gloomily expressed its conviction that Germany, who had made large restitutions and provided coal and by dint of ruinous purchases of foreign securities paid the first milliard marks after the May schedule of payments was drawn up, and who, moreover, had managed to cover a second contribution of half a milliard in the middle of November by deliveries of goods, could not, except by a miracle, pay the instalment of half a milliard due on January 15th. The imminence of the crash is the dominant fact in the European situation; but the most significant point is France's recognition of the inevitability of the crisis. It is strange how enlightened economists can go on issuing warnings for three years; and how politicians take no heed; and how in the end, when it is probably too late, the politicians awaken in panic to what they regard as the startling reality.

It happened in France that even so recently as March, M. Briand was clamoring for stupendous sums, and marching his men to Düsseldorf; that M. Doumer, the French Finance Minister, who should surely understand economics, was asking for even more than M. Briand; that M. Poincaré was bewailing the modesty of his compatriots' claims. It happened in May that the ex-President —who apparently has never studied the problem of wealth transference—was bewildered because Germany was not made to pay on the nail a simple matter of twelve milliards that she theoretically owed; that the French Premier was criticized for accepting the bagatelle of one hundred and thirty-two milliards as the total of the German debt, and was bitterly blamed for not occupying the Ruhr and so keeping down the race of supermen who might too easily recover and produce milliards while France waited and watched on both banks of the Rhine.

Right up to November there was a stolid belief that the special budget which France prepares every year—in which expenditure on the ravaged north and war pensions are put on the debit side, and Germany's coming contributions on the credit side—would really be covered by Germany. I find it hard to say what particular fact eventually drove in upon the French consciousness the utter inability of Germany to meet her obligations. Probably it was the cumulative effect of many things. First that hard-headed business man, M. Loucheur, had thought it wise, as a matter of precaution, to conclude a separate voluntary accord with Germany which contracted out of the Treaty and the schedule of payments, and endeavored to assure France of more than her share of the common Allied credits. Probably M. Loucheur was acting with more wisdom than he knew —making assurance doubly sure, putting—to use a popular phrase—a second string to France's bow. The Allies being unable to coerce Germany, thus ran the risk of getting nothing, while France who has a decisive army in Europe to employ, would be bought off if she, at least, obtained something. Germany under this accord was to furnish France with material and not cash. The first note of alarm was struck when it was discovered that Germany had had to buy with paper marks half of the first milliard abroad. It began to dawn on a few Frenchmen that paper marks could not be poured out and spent in this fashion for long. English and American economists who had hitherto been scoffed at and called unpleasant names were at the same time prophesying fiscal disaster. France began to lend an attentive and a polite ear.

Then the mark collapsed. It was a crash such as had not been anticipated in France. Down came the mark to last year's level of the Austrian krone. The descent was swift as lightning, and even an economically uneducated politician cannot help realizing that the further money drops the greater grows the speed of its plunge. It was just as the Washington Conference was opening its sittings that with breathless amazement France discovered that, holding in her own hands a special budget, she was faced with an insolvent Germany. In one week the tocsin of the whole press was set ringing. Hundreds of articles were written to prove what had hardly been considered anything but a fantastic argument of pessimistic pro-Germans: that Germany could not export her wealth, that Germany was bankrupt, that there would be default in January not due to recalcitrancy but to impecuniosity. The shock was tremendous. The effect on the mentality of the French when the Reparations Commission went from Paris post-haste to Berlin to study on the spot the causes and consequences of the krack was staggering. The new glimpse of realities bewildered the French. At last, after three years, the election cry of "Germany will pay," upon which the financial policy of France has been built, rang hollow in French ears.

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If Germany does not pay, what of the huge French debt swollen to three hundred and twenty milliard francs? What of the deficit in each year's budget—not of a milliard or two, as one would suppose if one merely considered the parliamentary wrangles about the ordinary twenty-five milliards budget; but of twenty to twenty-five milliards more, which the Treasury has in fact to find, from public loans, from taxation, from bank borrowings, from emission of paper money in one form or another? If it is untrue that the ex-enemy can find the wherewithal to acquit her obligations if only the sabre is rattled loudly and often enough, then plainly French finance ministers have been building on shifting sands. The three years have been worse than wasted: they have been used to organize chaos.

Can it really be that French politicians have believed for so long gross financial fictions? Have they sincerely confided in Germany's unimaginable capacity, or have they gone on preferring, during their little stay in office, deliberately to ignore uncomfortable facts? There is every reason to suppose that they have been genuinely deceived, that war engendered a patriotic mysticism, and that they are coming only now to understand the impossibility of obtaining indemnities on the scale and in the manner demanded. It is increasingly obvious that sooner or later there will have to be a general adjustment not merely of inter-Allied financial relations, but of the economic relations of all peoples. The solidarity of the world in these days, when debts are as bad for the creditor as for the debtor, when falling exchanges mean falling employment in distant lands, when there can be no evil suffered by our neighbors which will not afflict us, is manifest. France has not cared to discuss cancellation of debts chiefly because the obvious corollary of America and England forgiving France is that France should forgive Germany. Assuming the German debt to be good, assuming that America would not press and embarrass France in any case, France stood to lose by any all-round arrangement. But clearly the situation is radically altered if the German debt is a bad debt, if France's credits cannot effectively be mobilized.

I am bound, however, while registering this change of appreciation of Germany's capabilities, to record the probable result of this belated discovery on French policy. The outlook is, as I write, black indeed. That Germany should fall into arrears, that Germany should—like the dead but galvanized M. Waldemar in Edgar Allan Poe's story—suddenly fall into deliquescence, that Germany should throw out of gear all French calculations, and threaten, like a blind Samson, to pull down the pillars of France on her own confusion, not only aroused dismay, but aroused anger. I trust that better counsels will prevail before the fatal date of January 15th. But one has only to read the newspapers to see that an attempt is being made to prove that if the mark has fallen it is because the Germans willed it. They do not mind committing suicide if they can only cheat France of her dues! Some thunderous articles are being written by the most influential politicians out of office. Particularly do I note the utterances of M. Gaston Jèze, a truly liberal economist, who regretfully predicts that the French people are certain to be exasperated and will call for energetic military measures again. To what purpose? The occupation of the Ruhr has been shown to be an unprofitable business. France would even on an immediate profit and loss basis, be throwing good money after bad. The seizure of customs, the institution of a commission of debt, will give the Allies more responsibility than relief. But logic does not accompany anger. It is my duty to declare that there are signs of a great stampede, which no French government will be able to resist.

Thus an entirely new and calamitous European situation may be created; and in so far as America can help to prevent the catastrophe she should for her own sake spare no pains. France deserves sympathy, but while these financial promises and disappointments and obligations and inevitable bankruptcies which will breed bankruptcies, these fictitious treaties with their poisonous hatreds and deadly illusions, constitute the régime under which Europe lives or rather stifles, there can be no hope of settled peace. The Reparations Commission has power to raise the Allied liens on Germany until she recovers—as has been done in the case of Austria; it may postpone the date of payment; it may permit German magnates or American and British bankers to lend money to the government on the strength of property hypothecated to the Allies; but unanimity is needed, and the campaign now being urged calls for the refusal of the French delegates to vote for anything resembling a moratorium or a relinquishment of rights. That campaign will undoubtedly grow—unless France perchance comes back from Washington with hands that are not empty, or at least there results from Washington a subsequent international congress for the settlement of the world's economic muddle.

There are many minor proposals, such as that of Professor Charles Gide, who would have the reparations bonds handed to England and America (who could tear them up if they pleased for

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shaving paper) in payment of France's debt, and in corresponding annulment of Germany's debt to France. Such an unbusinesslike transaction might, of course, turn out to be a good stroke of business. But this and similar methods of meeting the terrific crisis are niggling. It is not palliatives that are needed. The problem which is raised in the most acute form in which it has yet been raised by the German collapse is broader than the German collapse, is broader than the French embarrassment. It is the problem of putting together the world's financial and economic machinery which is not working, which is not only in disrepair, but may smash up into smithereens unless it is overhauled at once. If the January possibilities are only understood—and it is useless merely to stave off the day of reckoning for three or six months—then perhaps the prospect of this crash and its consequences may yet be a cheerful recall to the sanity of universal cooperation.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

Ulster—The Crux of the Irish Conference

THE Irish Conference has come at last to Ulster, the crux of every attempt to settle the Irish question. It was so in 1914, when Ulster organized the Volunteers to resist the Asquith Home Rule act and the Amending bill was proposed to avert civil war. It was so in the remarkable negotiations of 1916, when Mr. Lloyd George's skill had actually brought Mr. John Redmond and Sir Edward Carson to agreement—an opportunity which might have been turned to golden uses, but was allowed to slip, wasted away. And it is so now. Ulster is still the crux.

Sinn Fein is saying in effect "Our ideal of 'Ireland a Nation' means two things: independence and a united Ireland. You have destroyed the unity of Ireland by the Act of Parliament which has made the six-county Ulster autonomous by statute. We must admit that whether by its own free will or by the unceasing instigation of British policy—and we blame British policy—homogeneous Ulster (whatever area that may be taken to comprise) is bitterly opposed at present to union with the rest of Ireland. Both you and we have said that there can be no question of coercing Ulster. But we ask you what is the most that you can do to diminish the present disruption of Ireland, and to provide in some degree the elements of a larger unity. For such a gain we on our part might be able to recommend the Dail Eirann and those who elected it to accept something less than the complete independence to which they are entitled—in a word continuance within the British Empire." It is unnecessary to assert that any "offer" was made in this precise shape. The minutes of the Conference are not published. But, broadly speaking, this does represent the give-and-take by which it is hoped to reach a settlement, whether it be called "offer" or "bargain" and from whomsover it is supposed to have proceeded first.

That being so, one may perhaps be forgiven for stating just what the Ulster question is. It may seem a little elementary, but as there are many people here who only realize in a general way that Roman Catholics and Protestants are as inextricably mixed in Ulster as Poles and Germans in Upper Silesia, so possibly there are Americans also who will be glad to have a short analysis by which to judge what they read of the negotiations.

The geographical Ulster—of the "Ulster, Munster, Leinster, Connaught" of schoolboy days—comprises nine counties. The present political Ulster, which is under the authority of the new Northern Parliament, consists of six counties only, out of the nine. County Cavan, Donegal County and Monaghan County are not included in it. The table which follows shows the distribution of the nine counties at the census of 1911 into Roman Catholics and "others" (Protestants) and also the totals for the present six-county Ulster and for the geographical nine-county Ulster.

PRESENT SIX COUNTY ULSTER	ROMAN CATHOLIC	PERCENT	OTHERS	TOTAL
Antrim Co.	39,751	20.51	154,113	193,864
Armagh Co.	54,526	45.33	65,765	120,291
Belfast (County Borough)	93,243	24.10	293,704	386,947
Down Co.	64,485	31.56	139,818	204,303
Fermanagh	34,740	56.18	27,096	61,836
Londonderry	41,478	41.41	58,367	99,845
Londonderry City ..	22,923	56.21	17,857	40,780
Tyrone	79,015	55.39	63,650	142,665
Total for the present six-county Ulster...	430,161	35.19	820,370	1,250,531

	ROMAN CATHOLIC	PER CENT	OTHERS	TOTAL
Co. Cavan	74,271	81.46	16,902	91,173
Donegal Co.	133,021	78.93	35,516	168,537
Monaghan Co.	53,363	74.68	18,092	71,455
Total for the geographical nine-county Ulster	690,816	43.67	890,880	1,581,696

Observe first the omission of the three counties from the area of the Northern Parliament. Of course, it may be said: How could you possibly include in Orange Ulster three counties with a total of 260,655 Roman Catholics against 70,510 Protestants? That is a good reason though not one that appeals strongly to Orangemen. Their

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motive for letting the three counties go was different. In the total for all nine counties the Roman Catholic population is only 200,000 less than the Protestant. Reduce this to the proportion which represents voters on the register and it is clear that the Orangemen would have no stable majority at all in Ulster as a whole and that the growth of the electorate, an influx of residents from the south or a mere turn-over of some thousands of votes might bring all Ulster at any time into and under a united Irish Parliament. The six-county area is that which suits the Orangemen and they would resist any re-settlement which made them the dangerous gift of the whole nine.

But now from the six counties we must select the figures for Fermanagh and Tyrone:

	ROMAN CATHOLIC	PERCENT	OTHERS	TOTAL
Fermanagh	34,740	56.18	27,096	61,836
Tyrone	79,015	55.39	63,650	142,665

One has heard of cases in which a German township has been handed over to Polish sovereignty because it is a German island in a Polish countryside—just as Derry City may be included in Ulster, though it is Roman Catholic, because the surrounding Derry County is Protestant—but this must be the first time since the Great War that an actual majority spread over an area the size of these two counties has been handed over bodily to the minority side. In logic and justice, of course, Sinn Fein has a complete right to demand that Tyrone and Fermanagh should be detached from Ulster and added to Southern Ireland; a Protestant minority of nearly fifty per cent would suffer, but that is not so great an injustice as that over fifty per cent of Roman Catholics should be forced into Ulster.

It is worth while, perhaps, to trace this Roman Catholic majority through the various local authorities of the two counties. Here, for instance, is the distribution of the seats in the County Councils at the elections of June, 1920:

	Total Seats	Sinn Fein	Nationalist	Unionist	Majority
Fermanagh	27	9	7	11	SF-N
Tyrone	28	14	3	11	SF

And here is the distribution of seats at the same elections for the Rural District Councils. It will be seen that in Ulster the old Constitutional Nationalists still survive and have elected a fair number of members. Between them, Sinn Fein and Nationalists hold the majority in seven councils out of eleven; the Unionists control only three.

RURAL DISTRICT COUNCILS

CO. FERMANAGH	Total Seats	Sinn Fein	Nationalist	Unionist	Majority
Belleek	6	3	2	1	SF
Clones No. 2....	9	3	3	3	SF-N
Enniskillen No. 1	29	12	2	15	U
Irvinestown	15	3	2	10	U
Lisnaskea	20	7	4	9	SF-N

CO. TYRONE	Total Seats	Sinn Fein	Nationalist	Unionist	Majority
Castlederg	14	7	—	7	—
Clogher	16	7	—	9	U
Cookstown	17	5	6	6	SF-N
Dungannon	17	4	5	8	SF-N
Omagh	39	26	—	13	SF
Strabane No. 1...	19	3	7	9	SF-N

Finally, the Boards of Guardians, who administer Poor Law relief, also elected in the summer of 1920, show the same result. Sinn Fein and Nationalists control six boards, the Unionists only two.

	Seats Total	Fein Sinn	Nationalist	Unionist	Majority
Enniskillen	50	24	5	21	SF-N
Irvinestown	19	4	3	12	U
Lisnaskea	20	7	4	9	SF-N
Clones	25	11*	4	9	SF-N
Castlederg	14	7	—	7	—
Clogher	16	7	—	9	U
Cookstown	20	6	6	8	SF-N
Dungannon	20	4	6	10	—
Omagh	44†	26	1	15	SF
Strabane	40‡	13	8	17	SF-N

To have added the two counties to Southern Ireland would never have been easy; to take them away from Ulster now is much more difficult. If it be true that the Roman Catholic majority are preparing armed rebellion against their inclusion in Ulster, it is even more probable that the minority (assisted by the Protestants of the other counties) would now fight against being torn away from the six-county Ulster. Nor is there really a great deal to choose between the injustice of putting fifty-five percent of Catholics under Unionists or forty-five percent of Unionists under Catholic rule. It is injustice in either case if it can be avoided, and a hardship if it cannot.

To give the counties an option to vote themselves, as counties, into or out of Southern Ireland does not wholly remedy the grievance, because the county-majority is definite and the result of the option would be certain. But the poll need not be taken by counties. It could be taken by parishes and by a familiar expedient, a boundary commission could trace a line through the counties, leaving as large blocks as possible of Catholics and Protestants on their right side of the frontier. In fact, the intelligent layman can construct for himself maps based on voting and census figures

* Also one Republican Labor.
† Includes two Liberals.
‡ Includes one Liberal and one Independent.

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which show that continuous chunks of Catholic territory can be traced out not only in Fermanagh and Tyrone but in Londonderry, Down and Armagh and even Antrim also, and if a plebiscite by parishes were held it is certain that the resulting boundary commission would have to deprive Ulster of these Catholic territories.

That is one possibility of the future. But it is recognized that the settlement can only be reached with Ulster's consent. She is not to be coerced, and the only effectual means of persuading her is to bring to bear upon her the pressure of the English Unionist party. Hitherto the English Unionists have always encouraged Ulster in an obstinate refusal to concede anything and (up to 1914) in the threat of open rebellion. Now the situation is changed. The Unionists, apart from the extremist section, are willing to urge compromise on Ulster. But anything involving surrender of territory is difficult both for Ulster and for the Unionists. Opinion therefore is turning to a different and more supple method.

The suggestion is, in brief, that while Southern Ireland and the six-county Ulster should have autonomy through separate provincial councils, all the major services necessary to a united Ireland should be carried on through a single superior Parliament: a Dominion Parliament, that is to say, with Provincial Councils beneath it. It is not a new idea, but it looks promising today because it evades the difficulty of surrender of territory by Ulster, it preserves the unity of Ireland, which would be shattered by a boundary commission operating a new partition, and it holds out the prospect of an increasing measure of unity, as the different parts of Ireland discovered how much they had in common.

There we must leave it. As a matter of practical politics, much depends on the readiness of the Tory leaders (including Mr. Bonar Law) to tell Ulster that in their opinion the time has come when she must make concessions. That might be decisive. The fifty Tory Die-hards cannot by themselves wreck the negotiations. They need supporters and a man who really counts to lead them. But if the Tory party in general or its leaders should fail Mr. George, then Ulster will certainly not give way. Ulster may in any event refuse to compromise. Then Mr. George will resign and everything is in the melting pot again.

AN ENGLISH LIBERAL.

England, November 7.

CORRESPONDENCE

[The New Republic welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest, and especially concerning articles which have appeared in its columns. Those of 300 words or less are necessarily more available for publication than longer letters.]

A Preference for Japan

SIR: In a recent article of mine entitled The A. B. C. of the Conference in the New Republic, I said:

"In 1918 the Chinese government needed money for the Peking-Kalgan Railway. It borrowed it from Japanese banks. Japanese traders are now to have a preference in providing the Peking-Kalgan Railway with its supplies."

It is now pointed out to me by Mr. Odagiri, who is a director of the Yokohama Specie Bank and who is intimately acquainted with Japanese-Chinese affairs, that the supplies provided by the Japanese to the Peking-Kalgan Railway were locomotives and that these locomotives were American locomotives. He also points out to me that American locomotives have been bought by the Chinese governmental railway authorities from Japanese traders even when other Japanese traders were offering Japanese locomotives at a slightly lower price. It would thus seem to be indicated that a preference for Japanese traders may not at all imply a necessary preference for Japanese goods.

The question whether or not any preference of any sort is desirable and defensible would still remain. I am much obliged nevertheless to Mr. Odagiri for pointing out to me the modifications which a preference may have in facts.

Washington. WILLIAM HARD.

Munitions and the League

SIR: In his article on Private Enterprise and War (in your issue of November 16th), Professor Hudson has overlooked one factor upon which the whole question of government ownership of munition plants hangs—the League of Nations. If war is to remain the principal means of settling international disputes, the production of munitions should remain in private hands and neutrals should be allowed to supply belligerents with arms. Otherwise, as Professor Hudson points out, every government would have to develop establishments in peace in order to be adequately prepared for war. However, under a regime set up by a League of Nations this argument falls to the ground. According to the Covenant of the League (Articles 12-16) "legal" wars, in which neutrals may lend support to belligerents in the form of munitions, without violating their neutrality, are for the most part abolished. Under an ideal Covenant "legal" wars would be abolished altogether. In case an "illegal" war breaks out—in defiance of the procedure of the League—the belligerent will not be able to call on neutrals for munitions, etc., because there won't be any neutrals. Instead of supplying the belligerent with instruments of war with which to defy the League, they will be obliged at least to blockade him, in order to compel him to conform to the will of the League. Consequently, such a belligerent will be unable to secure munitions abroad whether they are manufactured by foreign governments or by foreign individuals. It is absurd to say that the possibility of such a predicament —brought about by the League in order to limit wars—will force nations to increase military establishments in order better to be prepared for wars! Every nation which enters the League willingly, will gladly limit the production of munitions if it has faith in the procedure of the League. Obviously it can limit the production of munitions much more closely if they are produced by government rather than individual agencies.

The restriction of the production of munitions is impossible without a League of Nations. At the same time, a League will never function effectively until every member takes the production of munitions away from private agencies, and until the League outlaws every attempt on the part of a "neutral" to supply a belligerent with munitions when he embarks on a war contrary to the mandates of the League.

RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL.

Princeton, New Jersey.

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The Chinese Bankers Association

SIR: I should like to bring to your readers' attention the most significant recent development in China, pertaining to the Washington Conference. A recent Conference of the Chinese Bankers Association, besides deciding to send two representatives as financial advisors to the Chinese delegation at Washington, it is reported, threw its support behind the following policies:

1. China should throw open her economic resources to free international competition upon the cancellation of all special economic rights and privileges by the powers.
2. The removal of restrictions on Chinese customs in return for abolition of the inland "likin" (tax).
3. China welcomes the new Consortium, provided its activities do not affect China's own existence.

The Chinese Bankers Association is at present the greatest force for political honesty and good government in North and Central China. Its influence with the Peking government as well as with the public is considerable. If policy No. 1 means the opening of all Chinese territory outside the existing treaty ports of foreign enterprise, it may prove an important new element in the negotiations concerning China.

HAYDN HAINES.

New York City.

To Help the Mentally Sick

SIR: The federal government has recognized the necessity of making adequate provisions for a well paid and highly trained staff at the state institutions for the insane, where the Veterans Bureau has established Re-educational and Vocational Units among the ex-soldiers of the World's War;—one therapeutic aid to every ten soldiers being the radio allowed by the government.

New York State has failed to recognize the value of occupational therapy as an agent in hastening cures and causing improvement among the mentally sick. In the Metropolitan hospitals, where there is a net population of approximately 16,000 civilians, there are no more than a dozen occupational and re-educational workers. This is a ratio of one aid to about every 1,350 patients, or a percentage of .00074 of an aid to each patient. Such flagrant neglect on the part of the so-called richest state in the Union is a very poor and shameful showing.

In spite of which, bills for improving this criminal, inefficient, wasteful and sad spectacle, have been unalterably opposed at every turn as being too costly.

A thousand pities that such a stupid policy persists! Anyone acquainted with the work turned out by patients through funds contributed by rational philanthropists knows that men and women are helped mentally and economically to "come back."

These conditions must be generally unknown for such an attitude to exist. It seems as though the remedy lies with spirited men and women, other than psychiatrists, who are making a splendid fight for such a bill, to write their political representatives urging legislation to correct such a situation.

REBECCA KNABENHOFF.

Brooklyn, New York.

VERSE

The Bird of Jesus

It was pure indeed,
The air we breathed in, the light we saw,
I and my brother, when we played that day,
Or piped to one another; then there came
Two young lads of an age with one another,
And with us two, and these two played with us,
And went away.

Each had a bearing that was like a prince's,
Yet they were simple lads and had the kindness
Of our own folk—lads simple and unknowing:
Then, afterwards, we went to visit them.

Theirs was a village that was not far off,
But out of reach—toward elbow, not toward hand:
And what was there were houses—
Houses and some trees—
And it was like a place within a fold.

We found the lads,
And found them still as simple and unknowing,
And played with them; we played outside the stall
Where worked the father of the wiser lad—
Not brothers were the boys, but cousins' children.

There was a pit:
We brought back clay and sat beside the stall,
And made birds out of clay; and then my brother
Took up his bird and flung it in the air:
His playmate did as he,
And clay fell down upon the face of clay.

And then I took
The shavings of the board the carpenter
Was working on, and flung them in the air,
And watched them streaming down.

There would be nought to tell
Had not the wiser of the lads took up
The clay he shaped: a little bird it was;
He tossed it from his hand up to his head:
The bird stayed in the air.

O what delight we had
To see it fly and pause, that little bird,
Sinking to earth sometimes, and sometimes rising
As though to fly into the very sun:
At last it spread out wings and flew, and flew,
Flew to the sun!

I do not think
That we played any more, or thought of playing,
For every drop of blood our bodies held
Was free and playing, free and playing then:
Four lads together on the bench we sat:
Nothing was in the open air around us,
And yet we thought something was there for us—
A secret, charmed thing.

So we went homeward: by soft ways we went
That wound us back to our familiar place:
Some increase lay upon the things we saw:
I'll speak of grasses, but you'll never know
What grass was there; words wither it and make it
Like to the desert children's dream of grass:
Lambs in the grass, but I will not have told you
What fleece of purity they had to show;
I'll speak of birds, but I will not have told you
How their song filled the heart; and when I speak
Of him, my brother, you will never guess
How we two were at one!

Even to our mother we had gained in grace!

PADRAIC COLUM.

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The Briary-Bush

The Briary-Bush, by Floyd Dell. New York: A. A. Knopf. $2.50.

MR. H. G. WELLS'S chickens are coming home to roost. In this long novel of modern marriage in young Chicago one finds the most serious acceptance of all literature, but rising above Plato and St. Paul and Tolstoi and Nietzsche and Dante and Milton there appears that great headliner of ideas, young 'Erb. It is Wells, not Plato, who presides over Felix Fay and Rose-Ann. In their Hungarian restaurant in the Loop, and with their Hungarian stew, they consume the generalizations on which we all nourished ourselves fifteen years ago. When Rose-Ann gives Felix his freedom it is mainly because she read of it in a book; and out into the moonlight of literature he goes with his moonlit freedom, a literary moon-calf to the end. H. G. Wells, naturally, only served the purposes of Rose-Ann and Felix Fay. He only touched off the explosion. But one feels all through The Briary-Bush an enormous preponderance of ideas and feelings derived from contemporary literature. The community that is most real to Felix Fay and his friends is the community of letters.

That special community of letters is admirably reported in The Briary-Bush. It is, with whatever serious defects it possesses as a story, an accurate and honest autobiography of a quite characteristic literary youth. That youth does not actually resemble the young man in Mr. Howells's Hazard of New Fortunes, but in substance Mr. Dell has given us another Hazard of New Fortunes, and his realism is very much in the Howells tradition. I was going to say, the genteel Howells tradition, because Mr. Dell is decidedly genteel. He is even afraid to quote Whitman straight. But after all there is some capacity for candor. Mr. Dell is more deeply concerned with the marital adventure than with the literary and journalistic adventure, and he gives us a fuller representation than Howells did of his babes in the marital wood.

That wood is placed in the heart of Chicago. Felix Fay has now left down-state journalism and come with the appropriate emotions to try his fortune in Chicago. Looking on himself as fatally timid, but really possessing a cat-like faculty for landing on his feet, he gets his job as assistant dramatic critic on a respectable daily, The Chronicle, and then, his young ego seeking comfort, looks around for some corner in which to curl.

He finds a snug corner in a social settlement. Rose-Ann is a realistic young woman, devised according to the Shavian formula, and in a short time she annexes little Felix. She is a red-haired girl, quite beautiful enough to charm him, but the essential fact is that she is going to work through him to bring about his success. Incidentally, she is a "pagan." They occupy a romantic suburban shack, lent to them by a fellow newspaper man for the first week they are married, and in the early winter hours she takes a snow-bath, "unclothed and rosy in the morning wind." The quality of this picture is as sentimental as September Morn; and this is a basic quality in Floyd Dell. But he gives quite as much lively human expressiveness to their search for an apartment as Howells did to the equally revealing search in A Hazard of New Fortunes. And the Rose-Ann apartment is the right sort of studio for their transitory, picturesque, extra-territorial life. The native city of commerce, so to speak, lies all around them; but they and their few friends have nothing to do with it. They begin, indeed, to give a few parties, and Rose-Ann rather fancies herself in the rôle of literary hostess and she compels Felix to buy and wear a dinner-coat. But this is a failure. He can't stand even this much contact with the brute reality that surrounds them. Rose-Ann nearly slides into pregnancy. But that, too, would be a fatal hostage to the bourgeoisie. It is prevented, and Rose-Ann cuts her hair and burns her corsets. She goes to work on a moving picture magazine.

Felix and Rose-Ann have two constant companions. Clive Bangs, a newspaper man, wants to marry Phyllis in the regular way some time after he has persuaded Phyllis to renounce marriage. Phyllis won't marry him and indeed worships Felix as the apostle of married freedom. It is only after Phyllis has told Felix that she loves him, and after Felix has passed on the good word to Rose-Ann, that a crisis—a rather literary crisis—shakes their universe. Rose-Ann wants to make the large gesture of freedom, but before she has mastered her bourgeois jealousy she is discovered by Felix in her bourgeois tears. This makes Felix feel like a caged eaglet, but when he tells Phyllis in an amorous hour that lady recoils from him. Her hero is off his pedestal, and so is "freedom." She marries her newspaper man.

Rose-Ann's exigency, however, sends Felix into the arms of a little actress, with whom he spends a few impersonal days and nights. This adventure, narrated with an exeremely gauche humor, is not the end of their marriage. Rose-Ann goes to California, but Felix follows her. And again, as a symbol of her wildness, she leaves their moonlight beach picnic to go swimming. "It seemed profoundly characteristic of all her strangeness. What other woman in the world would have left, at dawn, the bed of happy love, to keep such an icy tryst! It was like their whole married life: the warmth of mere human happiness had not satisfied her; she must go out into the bleak strange arctic spaces of emotion; and he must go, too. . . . Well, let her keep her cold assignation with the moonlight alone, this time!

"'No,' he said resentfully, and gathered driftwood for a fire, while she undressed in the darkness. . . . He saw her go in, crying out with delight at the water's bitter coldness, and emerge, white and slender and dripping with silver moonlight, from the waves. . . . And this was the creature he had tried to make his wife! This seeker after strange and impossible beauty!"

It is carefully done, especially in its patient and studious symbolism, but it is lame psychology. Felix Fay's autobiography is the record of a creature unusually egocentric, who never does one act or offers one reflection of a warm, friendly kind. To ascribe to Rose-Ann the fishy coldness that is Felix Fay's is to leave the reader gasping. The "briary-bush," after all, is "being human, as they call it," and Felix's difficulty is to be free of humanity, to throw off obligation, to be a spectator, to bathe in what he calls beauty. Why this egoistic temperament should in the end be ascribed to the one warm creature in this book is a psychological mystery. It leaves one wondering if Floyd Dell really sees Rose-Ann.

This doubt mingles with another doubt as to the use of the fictional form for material not perfectly digested. Mr. Dell is clearly master of his quiet, slow, mild mood as a narrator, and he commands many significant incidents and a number of fine symbolic and gracefully chosen bits. But throughout The Briary-Bush he gives no sign that he feels he is dealing with mediocre personalities, personalities

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full of illusions about life and not deep or large in their feelings. This may arise in part from the slow pace of the novel—the pace of the reflective and discursive essayist who is accustomed to see life through his own eyes and to amble around other people's points of view. But it arises rather more, I believe, from complacency. Out of the literary life there often comes a feeling that "adaptability to human occasions" is a mere trick. Felix Fay specifically repudiates this idea in humbly describing Bangs who not only is "discussing the Yale-Harvard game with a college boy and in instant later local politics with a 'reform' alderman," but also "roved boldly into Platonic, Nietzschean and H. G. Wellsian spheres, and dwelt there as among solid realities." But the solid realities of The Briary-Bush are confined to Felix Fay's notions and interests, which are commonplace. If the world is to be penumbral to Felix's dreams, his dreams should be more dazzling.

But it is true that the homeless generation of which Mr. Dell writes had little place to grow except inwards. Cut off by literary socialism and an idea of beauty from immensely interesting though plug-ugly mercantile Chicago, it was pretty nearly obliged to become self-centred and self-satisfied. Still, a more adroit novelist would have introduced at least one adult into this book besides Rose-Ann's dreamy father and the benevolently sentimental Mrs. Perks.

FRANCIS HACKETT.

More That Must Be Told

More That Must Be Told, by Sir Philip Gibbs. New York: Harper and Brothers. $2.50.

CONFESSION is good for the souls of nations as of men. Penitence is a condition of reform. It is too much to say that the world is prepared to enter the confessional box or sit on the penitential stool, but it has become accustomed to hearing its indictment and is learning to ponder its terms. That indictment was drawn immediately after the Treaty of Versailles by Mr. Keynes. It has been amplified by Mr. Hobson and Mr. Norman Angell. Now comes Sir Philip Gibbs, premier journalist, appropriately representing the mood of confession. More That Must Be Told is by no means All That Must Be Told, but it is a considerable step toward it. Sir Philip calculates to a hair just how much his public will admit, and skilfully leads it a little farther along the path which it must follow.

Take, for instance, his treatment of Germany. At the outset he will have nothing of a divided responsibility for the war. "It would be ridiculous," he says, "now to re-examine all the psychological and political causes of the European war. . . . It is certain, if anything in history is certain, that nothing will ever reverse the verdict of guilty given against the German military caste for having planned, desired, and made the war. The German bureaucracy and bourgeoisie share the guilt by criminal consent." But immediately he proceeds to attenuate this comforting assurance by refusing to acquit the statesmen of the Allied nations of the guilt of "maintaining, defending, and intensifying the old régime of international rivalry." Later, he releases the Germans from the guilt of supporting their government. "'They did not rise and overthrow their devilish leaders.' That is true. But English folk decline to be branded because their government has done things which they detest, villainous things, without honor, dirty things which cannot bear the light of day." And finally he hazards the prediction that "Germany will gain first the victory for which the Allies professed to fight—the death of militarism—and she will emerge from all those years of evil cleaner and brighter and kinder, with a philosophy of peace which will help to save Europe."

Take the Treaty of Versailles. Sir Philip does not state frankly that the document was in explicit violation of the pre-armistice agreement. He cautiously adumbrates the fact by saying that "it violated in a hundred ways the principles proclaimed by President Wilson as the ideals of peace, *and accepted for a little while by victors and vanquished.*" (Italics ours). He conveys the same impression in his comment on Sir Eric Geddes's, "Germany will be squeezed until the pips squeak," which he calls "a naked betrayal of Wilson's pledge to German democracy which we had countersigned with our honor." But, on the other hand, he assures us that "as a document carving up Europe according to the old ethics of victors dealing with vanquished . . . it is difficult to see how a better peace could have been made."

It is easy to take Sir Philip Gibbs to task for similar suppressions and ambiguities. Doubtless he would merely refer them to a Still More That Must Be Told, to appear when it is safe. He would say that he had for the time being put on all that the journalistic traffic would bear. His confusion of thought and distorted ethics are a reflection of the popular mind. For example, on one page he praises President Harding for pronouncing unacceptable Germany's reparation offer in May, 1921, on the ground, not that it was inadequate to German ability to pay, but that if it had been accepted "a storm of fury would have broken out in France which would have been dangerous to the peace of Europe." On the next page he declares that as part of the same negotiation "the German Ambassador was privately notified that if his government accepted [the reparations agreement] the British government would on their side uphold the spirit of the Treaty with the strictest regard to German interests—especially in regard to Upper Silesia." Now we all know, including Sir Philip Gibbs, that the reparations agreement of May last is an impossible arrangement which puts an end to the short lived industrial revival of Europe; and further that England was false to her pledged word in regard to Silesia, and threw the decision to France via the League of Nations; yet it is public opinion, in which Sir Philip Gibbs acquiesces, that honor, justice and common sense are nothing compared to the preservation of the "entente" between England and France. Usually Sir Philip is a little ahead of his audience. In regard to Russia he stands absolutely pat with the closed minds of his generation. "Communism had its chance in Russia, and its destruction of capital, and private property, and individual liberty, and all the delicate machinery of modern life, in a desperate effort for absolute equality, has given to the world a ghastly exhibition of famine, typhus, and tyranny." It would be hard to find a statement more lacking in understanding than this, and the animus of it is so clear that Sir Philip might have spared his perfectly gratuitous reference to "the time of the anthropoid ape fighting for the liberty of his rock dwelling, or of Russian Bolsheviki fighting for the liberty of Soviet governance."

But altogether Sir Philip Gibbs sustains consistently his rôle of brave and honest journalist. He is at all events a useful one. He is truthful about Ireland, optimistic

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about Germany, apologetic in regard to France, open-minded in regard to England, candid toward the United States. He formulates much material toward a better understanding of the present world, and leaves further inferences to be drawn by his more informed and critical readers. He lends support, if not to the mood of penitence, at least to that of disillusionment which must precede any fundamental change for the better in human affairs. One theme is persistent through the book—the ineptitude of the governors and the stupidity of the governed. Of the leaders of the Allies he says, "They were but little men playing a game of hazard with millions of lives. They had, with few exceptions, no vision greater than the safety of their own jobs and the continuance of their own prestige." "Is there a soul in England who believes in the wisdom of Winston Churchill?" he asks, and answers "Not one, I think, in all the land." He goes on to note that "The Russian expeditions which he encouraged and helped to organize were so bad that no one dares to tell the truth of what happened," and that the adventure in Mesopotamia cost forty million pounds a year, "which served no other purpose than to 'boost' up the oil sharks." And finally he rebukes vigorously that popular anti-militarism which while abjuring war in general holds "this war" apart and holy. Apropos of the sympathy between English and Germans and the hate between English and French which sprang up over Silesia he remarks: "The bottom was knocked out of the meaning of the war, if ever it had any meaning beyond the bloody rivalry of politicians, using the bodies and souls of men for their dirty game, and the insanity of mobs, deluded by race passion, inflamed by their leaders." This is the confession that has often been murmured in the secrecy of the confessional-box, now shouted boldly from the house tops—the confession of the world made by the high priest of journalism, Sir Philip Gibbs. And his whole book is an account of the penance which the world is suffering.

ROBERT MORSS LOVETT.

Convention and Revolt in Poetry

Convention and Revolt in Poetry, by John Livingston Lowes. New York: Houghton Mifflin and Company. $2.25.

PROFESSOR LOWES teaches a doctrine, which in its bare outline is academic and professional enough to satisfy even men who pretend to learning and taste rather than to insight, in the criticism of poetry. The material of poetry, he argues, is a collection of sounds which "have not the remotest logical connection with the things for which they stand." They are arbitrary expressions, established by convention, designed to communicate meanings which lie altogether outside them, which they can only suggest, hint at, revivify, but cannot present. Without agreement, i. e., convention, concerning them, they would be simply so much gibberish, sound and fury, signifying nothing. Conventions thus inhere in the very nature of poetry, which by means of them creates an illusion that is itself restrained by the convention of "suspended disbelief." The criteria of this illusion are themselves conventional. They are not its relations to reality or to feeling, but, in a paraphrase of Aristotle's "impossible probable," its "inner congruity." Like other things born into this world alive they have ways of their own, ways determined b usage, and consequently capricious. Professor Lowes re gards usage as something different from and prior to con vention, its underlying dynamic. Why, does not appea It endows the behavior of conventions with its own qual ity of caprice. It makes them inherent or accidental. I determines their rise, development or survival. The psy chological faculties by which it acts are imitation an habit. By force of these, conventions appear as eithe plastic or rigid. The plastic ones get continually remodel ed; the rigid ones get shattered. The process is to be ob served in poetry in the life-history of its traditional sym bols. Some are revitalized by the poet's imaginative sym pathy and the poetry lover's knowledge, others are jus sloughed off, still others are worked to death.

Conventions which are revitalized are revitalized be cause we have, together with a need for novelty, "an in nate bias for the familiar" which good poetry satisfies b the fact that it is a "repristination" of the old whicl merges the familiar with the strange. Originality in poet is this power of repristination, of vitalizing conventio by "an inward touch." It is the "interpenetration o books and life," which constantly modifies tradition, an thus gives poetry a history, but remains itself unstaine by what it works in. When conventions have become to rigid to be susceptible of "repristination" they get broken The act of breaking them is revolt. Professor Lowes see a sort of Hegelian dialectic or Heracleitan flux in the pro cess. ". . . . Artistic reactions move in cycles. In per petual alternation the same tendencies emerge, give rise t their opposites, are supplanted by these opposites, and ou of that very eclipse emerge again, to undergo like meta morphosis." In this process the new comes as opposition as revolt against the old, and the "irony of revolt," Pro fessor Lowes thinks, is that the new can't stay new "fo more than a fleeting moment." Born of opposition, it i coerced by what it rejects to move beyond bounds in th contrary direction. The originality of revolt thus become distortion and grotesquery, preoccupied with the occult i man, the strange and the remote in space or time. Thu the chinoiserie and tininess of the contemporary move ments in poetry is really determined by their reactio against the "cosmic" qualities of earlier poetry; thei diction is governed by their rejection of the opulence sumptuousness and lavishness of the romanticist; thei abandonment of rhyme and meter is controlled by thei desire to be "free." But in effect all this is a movement o verse toward prose. For rhyme is an opportunity as wel as an obstruction, meter a brace and a girdle no less thar a hurdle; words are poetic when poetry makes them so and not by any inward quality of their nature as words.

And this is as true of the poetry of revolt as of an other poetry. By the limitations it sets upon itself it virtues may be observed and its defects ascertained. It rejections compel it to be always provincial and often trite Its affirmations may keep it fragmentary, trivial, cinemato graphic. Whether they will or not depends on how com pletely it can free itself of its repugnances, look forward and not back. What it looks toward, is, of course, no very promising. Like all the other modern modes in th arts, it moves—via polyphonic prose—toward the effacing of the boundaries of form, and the confusion of the arts which is the ancient plaint of critics. Its great danger i that it will cease to think, because of atrophy of the architectonic power.

Such is the outline. But the outline is the least of the

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book. Its commonplaceness is translated into an argument rare and strange by the range and variety of illustration which gives it substance, the appositeness of allusion, the good temper, the humor, and the honesty never sacrificed for cleverness. It is a thing solid without being heavy, learned without being professional. Beside the shrill, thin stuff of current vogue as the last cry in literary criticism, the book has a volume, a sonorousness, a richness and variety of overtone unbelievably rare. It is one of those infrequent, dangerous examples of philological learning turned to the uses of literary wisdom which somewhat grounds the illusion of the self-styled humanists that humanism is preoccupation with forgotten tongues, outmoded forms and irrelevant ideas. But humanism is in man and not in the humanities, in the living spirit which suffuses with its own life the dead bones of the petrified past. If this book is a true sample, Professor Lowes belongs to that class of American unfortunates who became professors because they were men of letters, not men of letters because they become professors.

Nevertheless, the limitations of his vocation are apparent in his admirable work, and perhaps the limitations of his mentality. The book is too much a study of the comparative anatomy of conventions, rather than of their life history. What is indicated is that change does take place, not the how and why of change. Of course, there is the Hegelian schema. But that merely confuses differentiation with antithesis, and being equally applicable to any alteration in poetry's moods and modes, fails to account for exactly these differences in which consist the individuality of any school or period as against predecessors or successors. They have nothing dialectical in them, even when done by rebels, as Mr. Lowes's own illustrations well show. New forms come by a sort of mutative budding and bourgeoning from the common stock whose vital principle is not in what they come from but in their own proper figure and motion. In the perspective of history Miss Lowell's theorizing is as mistaken about this, as concerned with surfaces, last terms, conclusions and dyings-out of living-processes as Mr. Lowes's. How much this is due, in the latter, to his philological preoccupations, how much to his eye-mindedness, is not clear. But that also the latter is fixative for his thinking is indisputably apparent. Only once in his book does there appear to be any clear recognition, in *feeling*, that poetry is a thing to be sounded, not seen. Like the vers-librists and the imagists—no matter what their protestations—he takes his poetry through the eye. This is why he regards, quite traditionally it is true, poetic effect as "illusion," and holds that there is none but a conventional connection between sounds and what they stand for. This is why, probably, he perpetrates the uncritical hypostasis of "usage," and falls into Hegelian schematisms when he theorizes about the process from school to school. It seems nowhere to occur to him that poetry may be—even when read unsounded—a thing heard and felt before it is a thing seen and understood, that its kinship with music is greater than its kinship with painting, that its tropes and images are the deposit of a stream of feeling which makes sound and suggests sense, that emotional pertinence is far more necessary to it than idealogical congruity, so that it may belie "reality," mix metaphors, and do all sorts of things with its materials, not thereby creating "illusion," but simply extending the world of the daily life with the world of its rhythms, cadences, meanings and visual suggestions, without at the same time making men feel that they have mistaken one for the other. It is as false to talk of the illusion of poetry as of the illusion of music, of mathematics or of chemistry. It is a "convention" of the eye-minded, as arbitrary and irrational as "usage" and as prejudiced as the public sentiment which leads a delicate and sensitive mind to make, in the course of lectures on convention and revolt in poetry, somewhat unworthy and altogether irrelevant references to Russia.

H. M. Kallen.

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Contributors

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